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PRIVATE PLACEMENT RULES 146 AND 240SAFE HARBOR?
ROBERT A. KESSLER*

S

I.

INTRODUCTION

ECTION 5 of the Securities Act of 19331 (1933 Act) in effect
requires registration of all securities. Sections 32 and 43 provide
various exemptions from the registration requiremenL One such
exemption-the private placement exemption-is found in section 4(2)
which exempts from registration, not the securities themselves, but
"transactionsby an issuer not involving any public offering."' With its
customary clarity, the statute not only fails to further delineate the scope
of the exemption, but even fails to define its obverse, the "public
offering." 5
For over forty years the determination of when this vaguely-worded
exemption was available was left to ad hoc administrative and judicial
interpretations which, in turn, created even greater uncertainty. 6 In
response the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated
rule 1467 which became effective June 10, 1974 and represents the
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. Professor Kessler received his B.A.
from Yale University, his J.D. from Columbia University and his LL.M from New York
University. He has authored two books and numerous articles on close corporations.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970). Since the Act is almost never referred to by its U.S. Code citations,
textual references will be simply to sections of the Act.
2. Id. § 77c.
3. Id. § 77d.
4. Id. §77d(2) (emphasis added).
5. The first paragraph of preliminary note 3 to rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (197S),
recognizes that the indefiniteness of such terms as "public offering" has led to uncertainties with
respect to the availability of the exemption, while the third paragraph of that note confesses:
"The term 'offering' is not defined in the rule. The determination as to whether offers, offers to
sell, offers for sale, or sales of securities are part of an offering (i.e., are deemed to be 'integrated')
depends on the particular facts and circumstances."
A definition of terms is a necessity if rule 146 is to achieve its aim of certainty. And, reluctant
as the SEC may be to concede it, a workable definition must be in terms of arbitrary
mathematical limits, for only quantitative or durational boundaries will solve the problem of
"integration" (i.e., when does an offering under the rule begin and end). A quantitative definition
likewise is required to define the desired outer perimeters of the exemption. The SEC has
wrestled long enough with the definitional problem to have realized this. See SEC v. Sunbeam
Gold Mines Co., 95 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1938). Fortunately, the SEC recognized the need for a
quantitative, mechanical test in adopting the thirty-five purchaser limit of rule 146(g).
6. See text accompanying notes 19-42 infra.
7. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1975), adopted in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5487 (April 23,
1974), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
2710 [hereinafter cited as Rule 146 Adopting Release].
This is, of course, not the first article on this important rule. While some securities lawyers,
especially those representing large reporting companies under the 1934 Act, undoubtedly feel it
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SEC's third attempt s to provide "objective standards upon which
responsible businessmen may rely in raising capital under claim of the
section 4(2) exemption ...." On May 7, 1975, the rule was amended10
"to decrease burdens on issuers in complying with the Rule."'
Unfortunately, the amendments accomplish this only to a very limited
extent, and, ironically, in the case of small issuers, may even increase
the dangers of relying on the rule.
represents some improvement over prior uncertainty, comment on the rule has been generally
unfavorable. See, e.g., Kinderman, The Private Offering Exemption: An Examination of Its
Availability Under and Outside Rule 146, 30 Bus. Law. 921 (1975); Kripke, SEC Rule 146: A
'Major Blunder,' 172 N.Y.L.J., July 5, 1974, at 1, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Kripke]; Rosenfeld,
Rule 146 Leaves Private Offering Waters Still Muddied, 2 Sec. Reg. L.J. 195, 212-13 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Rosenfeld). Even a member of the SEC staff (Mr. Lybecker) admits that
"[rlule 146 is not entirely without thorns and soft, subjective conditions." Alberg & Lybecker,
New SEC Rules 146 and 147: The Nonpublic and Intrastate Offering Exemptions from
Registration for the Sale of Securities, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 622, 643 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Alberg & Lybecker]. Their final words on the rule are: "Accordingly, although it may remain
risky and relatively expensive for many small businesses to use the nonpublic offering route to
raise needed capital, many medium to large-sized businesses should find transactions structured
to comply with rule 146 a relatively safe and not unreasonably expensive method of raising
capital." Id. at 643. See also Arthur, Rule 146 Under the Securities Act of 1933: A Significant
Codification, 56 Chi. B. Rec. 94 (1974); Green & Wittner, Private Placements of Securities Under
Rule 146, 21 Prac. Law 9 (1975); Rosenfeld, supra; Schwartz, Rule 146: The Private Offering
Exemption-Historical Perspective and Analysis, 35 Ohio St. L.J. 738 (1974); Note, SEC Rule
146-The Private Placement Exemption, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 1125 (1974).
For opinions on the earlier proposed version of the rule, see, e.g., Private Placements:
Implications of New Rule 146 (N.Y.L.J. ed. 1974); Cassidy & Berkowitz, Proposed Rule 146, 6
Rev. Sec. Reg. 949 (Mar. 26, 1973); Comments Reflect Differences Over Proposed Private
Placement Rule, BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 189, at A-1 to A-3 (Feb. 14, 1973).
8. Earlier proposed versions appeared in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5336 (Nov. 28,
1972), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,108, and SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5430 (Oct. 10, 1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,529.
9. Preliminary note 3 to rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1975). The adopting release
repeats this purpose several times: "The Rule is designed to provide more objective standards for
determining when offers or sales of securities by an issuer would be deemed to be transactions not
involving any public offering within the meaning of Section 4(2) of the Act and thus would be
exempt from the registration provisions of the Act." Rule 146 Adopting Release, supra note 7, 127 10,
at 2907-2. "The Commission believes that a rule creating greater certainty in the application of the
Section 4(2) exemption is in the public interest. . . ." Id. at 2907-3. "The Rule is designed to protect
investors while at the same time providing more objective standards in order to curtail uncertainty to
the extent feasible." Id. It should be noted, however, that the rule was also designed "to deter reliance
on [the exemption when the offering is] to persons who need the protections afforded by the
registration process." Preliminary note 3 to rule 146 supra. This ambivalence of purpose is
characteristic of the "cosmic tension" of the competing concerns of the safety of the issuer and
protection of the investor which continue to pervade the SEC exemption process. See text accompanying notes 18 & 81 infra for a manifestation of SEC concern for investor protection.
10. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5585 (May 7, 1975), [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
80,168 [hereinafter cited as Rule 146 Amending Release].
11. Id.
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There is no express statutory provision exempting the initial issuance
of stock to the organizers of even the closest of close corporations. Until
recently, exemption from registration of such transactions was available
only through section 4(2)'s vague nonpublic offering exemption. 12 Then,
shortly before the adoption of rule 146, the SEC, pursuant to section 3(b)
of the Act, 13 proposed rule 240, entitled "Exemption of Certain Limited
Offers and Sales by Closely Held Issuers."1 4 Rule 240 became effective,
in amended form, on March 15, 1975.15
Together, rules 146 and 240 represent the SEC's attempt to provide a
"safe harbor" for businessmen relying on the private placement exemption of section 4(2) of the Act. 1 6 It is the purpose of this Article to assess
12. Over and above the general rules on private placements, the SEC offered additional
guidance to small businessmen regarding their eligibility for exemption. But this, if anything, was
more vague than the general exemption rules. Thus, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov.
6, 1962), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 2774, stated: "The sale of stock to promoters who take the
initiative in founding or organizing the business would come within the exemption. On the other
hand, the transaction tends to become public when the promoters begin to bring in a diverse
group of uninformed friends, neighbors and associates."
13.
15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970). This section allows the SEC to exempt securities if it finds that
enforcement of the Act "is not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors
by reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of the public offering" where "the
aggregate amount at which such issue is offered to the public" does not exceed $500,000. Id. Rule
240, 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (1975), technically was promulgated under this section which exempts
the securities themselves, in contrast to § 4(2) which exempts the issuing transaction only.
However, the original release to the proposed version of rule 240 makes it clear that the
exemption is "for the issuer transaction only, not for the securities themselves." SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5499 (June 3, 1974), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
79,804. Furthermore, rule 240(g) states that securities acquired under it "shall be deemed to have
the same status as if they had been acquired in a transaction pursuant to section 4(2) of the Act," i.e.,
the exemption applies only to the transaction; the shares themselves are not exempt. It is therefore
clear that rule 240 is merely a special type of private placement exemption.
14. The rule was originally proposed in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5499 (June 3, 1974),
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
79,804.
15. 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (1975), adopted in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5560 (Jan. 24,
1975), [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. See. L. Rep. 80,066, effective Mar. 15, 1975
[hereinafter cited as Rule 240 Adopting Release].
16. Section 3(a)(11) of the Act also provides an exemption for "[any security which is apart of an
issue offered and sold only to persons resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of
such security is a person resident and doing business within . . .such State or Territory." 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1970). The circumstances under which this exemption is available have been
considerably clarified by the promulgation of rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1975), adopted in SEC
Securities Act Release No. 5450 (Jan. 7, 1974), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 2340. See note 89 infra.
However, rule 147 can be a trap for the unwary. For example, since this exemption is destroyed not
only by sales and resales to nonresidents of the issuer's state but also by offers to such non-residents,
even the "closest" of businesses in commuter states cannot safely utilize section 3(a( 11) or the
congruent rule 147. For example, a New York businessman who resides in New Jersey cannot safely
approach a fellow New Jersey resident to invest in his New York business under the exemption.
Therefore, knowledgeable businessmen rarely rely exclusively on rule 147 as their sole justification
for failure to register.
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these rules and examine how well their purposes have been achieved.
Unfortunately, one must conclude that both rules are a great disappointment since they impose too many burdens and do not lessen the
uncertainties which have so long plagued the subject.
The principle reason for the failure of these rules is the SEC's failure
to recognize and distinguish among the widely different types of
transactions subsumed under the "nonpublic" offering.
There are at least three types of "private placements" currently in
use. The first involves an offering to a limited number of people,
frequently strangers, and typically to raise money for a new venture,
e.g., the exploitation of a new invention. It is at least "quasi-public,"
since often the only feature distinguishing it from a genuinely public
one is that it is not made to an undifferentiated public, but is made to
fewer, "selected" people through a "chain letter" approach. This is the
type most fraught with dangers to the investor, and therefore it is
arguably the least deserving of exemption from registration. Secondly,
there is an offering, frequently of debt securities, to a large or small
(depending on the amount to be raised, which may run into millions of
dollars) group of institutional investors, typically banks or insurance
companies, by seasoned businesses in need of expansion capital.
Where large amounts of capital are needed, participation may be
fractionalized among the lenders to spread the risk and profit. A typical
example would be a public utility raising money for a new power
plant. In this type of placement, the investors, ordinarily all sizeable
corporations whose decisions are guided by financial experts, have
little need for the protections of the Securities Act. They are well able
to take care of themselves, no matter how large or small their
investment, or how many investors are included in the group. Finally,
there is the small business formation involving no more than a handful
of people who purchase a limited partnership interest, or stock in a
close corporation, or perhaps lend their money. All of the participants
are at least acquainted with one another, and frequently are related.
Although, typically, all expect to have a more or less active part in the
operation of the business, sometimes a "silent partner" will be willing
to risk his money in reliance on the business acumen of the others.
Typically, too, any subsequent transfer of the "securities" will be
merely a vehicle to accomplish a transfer of the entire business to new
Reliance on this exemption is further discouraged by state statutes such as the New York
Registration of Intra-State Offerings Law, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 359-ff (McKinney Supp. 1974),
which imposes additional blue sky burdens on issaers relying on the federal intrastate exemption
unless a state exemption is available. See note 164 infra.
In view of the foregoing pitfalls, even the small businessman seeking financing will normally
place primary emphasis on the non-public nature of the transaction, rather than on the intrastate
offering exemption.
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owners. While small business participants are frequently unsophisticated, both the initial formation of the business and any "bulk
transfer" of it will ordinarily be guided by attorneys who are in a
position to insure that their clients are adequately protected, not only
by full disclosure of pertinent information, but also by the terms of the
securities evidencing their investment participation. The federal law,
undoubtedly, was not intended to cover this third type of transaction,
which is frequently exempt even under state law. 17 Thus, although the
peculiar design of the statute-the all-encompassing registration requirement of section 5, coupled with the exemptions of sections 3 and
4-contributes to the failings of the private placement rules, the
primary fault rests with the SEC's failure to distinguish among these

different types of private placements.
II.

BACKGROUND OF RULE 146

Initially, one might well ask why it took so long for the SEC to come

up with these "objective criteria" so that issuers could readily determine when they could safely rely on the exemption. A safe guess is that

the SEC probably feared that mechanical tests would leave a loophole
through which clever securities lawyers could distribute securities to
the public without registration and thus impede the investor protection
(through the full disclosure) which registration is designed to insure."8
In any event, there was great confusion as a result of the SEC's failure

to exercise its rule-making power in this area.
There was an early rule of thumb that an offer to no more than

twenty-five persons was not a "public offering." 1 9 But it was never

17. See R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation 619-21 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited
as Jennings & Marsh].
18. Although the anti-fraud provisions have a broader application, the registration and
statutory prospectus requirements apply only to issuers, underwriters and, to a limited extent,
dealers, and persons in certain relationships to the three. Therefore, in order to hold private sellers
liable, the SEC ordinarily has been forced to show that they were somehow "underwriters." The
statutory definition of an "underwriter" includes a person who purchases from the issuer (or a
person in a "control" relationship with the issuer) "with a view to ...distribution." Securities Act
of 1933 § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970). Although the convoluted statute does not say so,
presumably a "distribution" is the equivalent of a "public offering," at least if it is a large-scale
distribution; otherwise one person could purchase an entire issue in a "non-public offering" and
immediately resell it without registration. The courts have accepted this reasoning and as a result
the SEC has been able to force registration in such situations, despite a claim of exemption by the
security-holders. See, e.g., Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959); In re Ira
Haupt & Co., 23 S.E.C. 589 (1946). See generally I L. Loss, Securities Regulation 551 (2d ed.
1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]. Conversely, if one purchased with an intent to invest and not
"with a view to distribution," it w.as not treated as a "public offering."
19. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
2740-44; see Jennings & Marsh, supra note 17, at 408.
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given official status as a rule, and it was, in effect, repudiated by the
only Supreme Court decision 20 which has ruled on section 4(2).
That 1953 decision, SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 2 ' became the most
important guide to availability of the private placement exemption.
The narrow holding of the case was plain enough: the issuer has the
burden of proving an exemption; 22 and it failed to do so where the
stock, though purportedly offered only to "key employees" who themwas sold to
selves took the initiative in seeking to buy it, actually
23
employees with widely diverse duties and salaries.
Despite the brevity of the opinion, the Court, as is frequently the
case, said too much. At one point it stated:
Exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act is the question.
The design of the statute is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of
information thought necessary to informed investment decisions. The natural way to
interpret the private offering exemption is in light of the statutory purpose. Since
exempt transactions are those as to which "there is no practical need for [the bill's]
application," the applicability of § 4(1) [now § 4(2)l should turn on whether the
particularclass of persons affected needs the protection of the Act. An offering to those
who are shown 24
to be able to fend for themselves is a transaction "not involving any
public offering."

At the end of the opinion, however, the Court stated:
The focus of inquiry should be on the need of the offereesfor the protections afforded
by registration. The employees here were not shown to have access to the kind of
information which registrationwould disclose. The obvious opportunities for pressure
and imposition make it advisable that they be entitled to compliance with § 5.25

The first statement appears sufficiently straightforward: if all the
offerees are able "to fend for themselves" the offering is exempt.
However, the concept of being able to fend for oneself is not defined.
It could be equivalent to having access to the information which
registration would disclose, but it seems to encompass a broader
concept. It suggests sophistication, and perhaps even more importantly,
suggests it as an alternative to access.
On the other hand, it is not completely clear that the Court regarded
access alone as sufficient to protect the exemption. The 1933 Act does
presuppose that access to information which registration would disclose makes an investor able to fend for himself,2 6 and so it would
20. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 126-27.
23. Id. at 121, 126.

24. Id. at 124-25 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
26. Registration is designed merely to guarantee full disclosure. It is assumed that, equipped
with such disclosure, the investor will be able "to fend for himself." The SEC summarized the
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follow that access alone should have been regarded as sufficient.
However, the holding could be viewed as analogous to that of a
common law cause of action in fraud and deceit where, although
nonreliance defeats the action, reliance alone is not sufficient to make
one out. In any event, the ambiguous relationship of the two tests left
room for expansive lower court and SEC interpretations.
Moreover, the access test itself was left open to later interpretation
because the Court formulated the access test not by defining access,
but by condemning lack of access (to information registration would
disclose). Although the Court may have intended to require access to
information registration would disclose, the manner in which the test
was phrased did not preclude lower courts from interpreting that some
other form of access is required. In short, the meaning of access was left to
the lower courts and SEC to define.
The most sensible reconciliation of the two statements would have
been to allow the exemption where the investor either had access to
the information which registration would disclose or was otherwise able
to fend for himself. In fact, mere access to information which registration would disclose should have assured exemption to prevent the
anomaly of a private placee getting greater protection than he would
have gotten had the securities been registered. However, the lower
federal courts 27 chose to create just such an anomaly and the SEC has

chosen to perpetuate it in rule 146.28
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Gilligan, Will

& Co. v. SEC, 29 interpreted the Ralston Purina case as follows:

purpose of registration: "Registration of securities does not insure investors against loss in their

purchase, nor does the Commission have the power to disapprove securities for lack of
merit-and it is unlawful to represent otherwise in the sale of securities. The only standard which
must be met in the registration of securities is an adequate and accurate disclosure of the material
facts concerning the company and the securities it proposes to sell. The fairness of the terms of
securities (whether price, promoters' or underwriters' profits, or otherwise), the issuing company's
prospects for successful operation, and other factors affecting the merits of securities, have no
bearing on the question whether securities may be registered.
"The purpose of registration is to provide disclosure of these and other important facts so
investors may make a realistic appraisal of the merits of the securities and thus exercise an
informed judgment in determining whether to purchase them. Assuming proper disclosure, the
Commission cannot deny registration or otherwise bar the securities from public sale whether or
not the price or other terms of the securities are fair or the issuing company offers reasonable
prospects of success. These are factors which the investor must assess for himself in the light of
the disclosures provided; and if the facts have been fully and correctly stated, the investor
assumes whatever risks may be involved in the purchase of the securities." The Work of the
Securities and Exchange Commission 2-3 (1967) (italics deleted).
For a criticism of the statute's underlying theory, see, e.g., Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1151 (1970).
27. The pre-rule cases are collected in Annot., 6 A.L.R. Fed. 536 (1971).
28. See Rule 146 Adopting Release, supra note 7.
29. 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959).
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The Court ...defined the standard to be applied in determining whether an issue is
a public offering. It held that the governing fact is whether the persons to whom the
offering is made are in such a position with respect to the issuer that they either
actually have such information as a registration would have disclosed, or have access
to such information. . . . The stipulation of facts here expressly states that tile
purchasers "were not supplied with material information of the scope and character
contemplated by the Securities Act nor were the purchasers in such a relation to the
issuer as to have access to such information concerning the company and its affairs."' 0

Since there appears to have been little doubt as to all four purchasers'
sophistication and ability to fend (one was a broker, one the wife of
another broker and the remaining two were friends of that broker), the
court's requirement of either actual knowledge of or access to information which registration would disclose was an implicit rejection of
sophistication as an alternative test.
In United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 3 1 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit went even further:
Appellants argue that the District Court erred in finding that the individual
purchasers were not able "to fend for themselves," noting that they were "sophisticated
investors" and "businessmen of mature experience." But "sophistication" is not a
substitute for "access to the kind of information which registration would disclose."
...Schedule A of the Securities Act... lists 32 categories of information that should be
included in a registration statement. This type of information is designed to protect the
investor by furnishing him with detailed knowledge of the company and its affairs to
make possible an informed investment decision. A purchaser of unregistered stock
must be shown to have been in a position to acquire similar information about the
32
issuer.

The court not only rejected the Ralston Purina sophistication test as
insufficient, but imposed a new requirement that purchasers must take
for investment. While justifiable on policy grounds of preventing a
two-step public distribution, the investment requirement was an obvious expansion of the Ralston Purina tests.
More recently, the Tenth Circuit, in Lively v. Hirschfeld,33 construed the Supreme Court decision as requiring both sophistication
(and exceptional sophistication at that) and access (and "regular access"
to information well beyond that which registration would give). The
court said:
After the Ralston Purina case the emphasis in the decisions has been placed on the
particular capabilities and information had by particular persons, buyers, plaintiffs, or
offerees. The Ralston Purina case requires this examination of the individuals solicited
to determine the nature of the offer, that is, to determine whether there was a public
need for registration. Thus the question has become whether there is a "need" for
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 466 (emphasis added).
376 F.2d 675 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 678 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

33.

440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
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registration as to the individuals or group concerzed, and the "public" or "private"
categories are not particularly descriptive. The "need" requirement is strict. The
Supreme Court in its description of a possible "private" group in Ralston Purina
includes only persons of exceptional business experience, and "a position where they

have regular access to all the information and records which would show the potential
for the corporation. When applied to the record in the case before us, the offerees are

not such persons of unusual business experience and skill, they did not have the degree
of access to the type of data as would meet the standard. There was, as indicated
above, the cross-examination of a plaintiff which showed him to be a person of some
experience in business, and there were general references to other buyers and offerees.
This cannot suffice under the decisions. The proof as to the particular buyer who
testified was not sufficient to meet the requirements as to him, even if he could be
considered alone. The testimony as to all other offerees was woefully short of the
requirement- The standard must apply to all the offerees if the Ralston Purina case is
to be meaningfully applied, and if the artificial classification of "plaintiffs" and the
accidental classification of "buyers" is to be 34prevented from determining the nature of
the offer in a private action such as this.

As implied earlier, a conjunctive interpretation of the two Ralston
Purina statements seems unwarranted. 3s Furthermore, the adjectival
glosses of these cases 3 6 obviously go beyond even the broadest permissible construction of Ralston Purina and impose additional requirements for availability of the exemption.
The case which caused the greatest concern among members of the
securities bar was the Fifth Circuit decision, SEC v. Continental
Tobacco Co. 37 While the decision was not as unfavorable as securities
lawyers had feared from reading the SEC's brief, it clearly did impose
further burdens on issuers seeking to make a non-public offering.
The offerors in Continental Tobacco prepared a prospectus and
required purchasers to sign a statement that they not only had received
the prospectus, but had read it, and, further, had investigated the
business and financial statements of the issuer by questioning the
issuer's officers and counsel. The statement concluded: "[I] do not
desire any further information or data concerning your company.1 38
The defendants failed to prove that all investors had received the
prospectus and signed the agreement. The court could have decided
the case on that basis, since, as it held, the Ralston Purina tests apply
to all offerees. However, it chose not to use that ground. Instead it
stated:
As pointed out by the Commission, "Even if it were assumed that Continenta's
prospectus provided those offerees to whom it was disseminated with all the informa34. Id. at 632-33 (emphasis added).
35. See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
36. Compare Bowers v. Columbia Gen. Corp., 336 F. Supp. 609 (D. Del. 1971), with the
cases discussed at text accompanying notes 29-34 supra.
37. 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
38. Id. at 146 n.1.
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tion that registration would disclose, this would not suffice to establish the requisite
relationship of those offerees to the company"... .[The] mere disclosure of the same
information that would be contained in a registration statement does not assure
exemption ....
In Lively v. Hirschfeld, . . . the Tenth Circuit held that under the standard of
Ralston Purina the issuer must ultimately prove that as to all offerees there was a lack
of public need for registration and the protections of the Act. Continental did not
affirmatively prove that all offerees of its securities had received both written and oral
information concerning Continental, that all offerees of its securities had access to any
additional information which they might have required or requested, and that3 9all
offerees of its securities had personal contacts with the officers of Continental.

Thus, Continental Tobacco expanded Ralston Purina's second testaccess to information registration would disclose-by requiring "any
additional information which [the offerees] might have required or
requested," and "personal contacts [between the offerees and the]
officers." More importantly, a vague new requirement, "relationship"
with the issuer, was imposed.
This new relationship requirement is traceable to a relationship
factor in Ralston Purina. At this point, it should be emphasized that
"factors" and "requirements" are not the same thing. Factors are
balanced against each other: the absence of one factor may be
outweighed by the presence of another. Requirements, however, are
mandatory: each requirement must be satisfied. The relationshipfactor
was implicated in the Ralston Purina Court's discussion of the inability of widely varied employees to fend for themselves:
The exemption, as we construe it, does not deprive corporate employees, as a class,
of the safeguards of the Act. We agree that some employee offerings may come within
§ 4(1) [now § 4(2)], e.g., one made to executive personnel who because of their position
have access to the same kind of information that the Act would make available in the form
of a registration statement. Absent such a showing of special circumstances, employees
are just as much
members of the investing "public" as any of their neighbors in the
40
community.

The Supreme Court was not imposing an additional requirement of
particular relationship, but merely was conceding that some employee
offerings could constitute private offerings. The most reasonable interpretation of its statement is that proof of a certain insider relationship may substitute for proof of actual access and thereby demonstrate
that the offerees meet the standard of being able to fend for themselves. Clearly, Ralston Purinatreated relationship to the issuer as an
alternative factor, as opposed to an added requirement. Following the
trend of the other lower court decisions, however, the Continental
39.

Id. at 160 (emphasis added).

40. 346 U.S. at 125-26 (footnote omitted).
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Tobacco case converted it from a disjunctive factor to a conjunctive
requirement.
Ultimately, the new relationship requirement is traceable to an early
opinion of the SEC's general counsel in which he declined to give an
opinion as to whether a proposed offering of $1,768,000 of preferred
stock to twenty-five offerees was exempt, but set forth four factors which
the SEC would use in determining the availability of the exemption: (1)
the number of offerees and their relationship to each other and to the
issuer; (2) the number of units offered; (3) the size of the offering; and (4)
the manner of offering. 4 1 After Ralston Purina the SEC issued a release
which purported to downplay the significance of the first factor, but
42
actually restated all four factors.
Most of the SEC "factors" and the judicial glosses on Ralston
Purina found their way into new rule 146, and, in the process, were
transmuted into requirements.

M. THE ONEROUS RULE 146
Paragraphs (c), 43 (d),44 (e)45 and (g)4 6 of rule 146 set forth the general
conditions for eligibility of the private placement exemption. These
41. SEC Securities Act Release No. 285 (Jan. 24, 1935), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
2740-44.
42. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
2770-83.
43. "(c) Limitations on Manner of Offering. Neither the issuer nor any person acting on its
behalf shall offer, offer to sell, offer for sale, or sell the securities by means of any form of general
solicitation or general advertising, including but not limited to, the following:
(1) Any advertisement, article, notice or other communication published in any newspaper,
magazine or similar medium or broadcast over television or radio;
(2) Any seminar or meeting, except that if subparagraph (d)(1) of this section is satisfied as to
each person invited to or attending such seminar or meeting, and, as to persons qualifying only
under paragraph (d)(1)(ii) of this section, such persons are accompanied by their offeree representative(s), then such seminar or meeting shall be deemed not to be a form of general solicitation or
general advertising;, and
(3) Any letter, circular, notice or other written communication, except that if paragraph (dXl)
of this section is satisfied as to each person to whom the communication is directed, such
communication shall be deemed not to be a form of general solicitation or general advertising." 17
C.F.R. § 230.146(c) (1975) (italics deleted).
44. "(d) Nature of offerees. The issuer and any person acting on its behalf who offer, offer to
sell, offer for sale or sell the securities shall have reasonable grounds to believe and shall believe:
(1) Immediately prior to making any offer, either(i) That the offeree has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that
he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or
(ii) That the offeree is a person who is able to bear the economic risk of the investment; and
(2) Immediately prior to making any sale, after making reasonable inquiry, either
(i) That the offeree has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that
he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or
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concern the manner of offering, the nature of the offerees, the offeree's
(ii) That the offeree and his offeree representative(s) together have such knowledge and
experience in financial and business matters that they are capable of evaluating the merits and
risks of the prospective investment and that the offeree is able to bear the economic risk of the
investment." Id. § 230.146(d) (italics deleted).
45. "(e) Access to or Furnishing of Information.
NOTE: Access can only exist by reason of the offeree's position with respect to tile
issuer. Position means an employment or family relationship or economic bargaining
power that enables the offeree to obtain information from the issuer in order to
evaluate the merits and risks of the prospective investment.
(1) Either
(i) Each offeree shall have access during the course of the transaction and prior to the sale
to the same kind of information that is specified in Schedule A of the Act, to the extent that the
issuer possesses such information or can acquire it without unreasonable effort or expense; or
(ii) Each offeree or his offeree representative(s), or both, shall have been furnished during tile
course of the transaction and prior to sale, by the issuer or any person acting on its behalf, the
same kind of information that is specified in Schedule A of the Act, to the extent that the issuer
possesses such information or can acquire it without unreasonable effort or expense. Tls
condition shall be deemed to be satisfied as to an offeree if the offeree or his offeree representative
is furnished with information, either in the form of documents actually filed with the Commission
or otherwise, as follows:
(a) In the case of an issuer that is subject to the reporting requirements of Section 13 or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
(1) The information contained in the annual report required to be filed under the Exchange
Act or a registration statement on Form S-1 under the Act or on Form 10 under the Exchange
Act, whichever filing is the most recent required to be filed, and the information contained in any
definitive proxy statement required to be filed pursuant to Section 14 of the Exchange Act and In
any reports or documents required to be filed by the issuer pursuant to Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Exchange Act, since the filing of such annual report or registration statement, and
(2) A brief description of the securities being offered, the use of the proceeds from the
offering, and any material changes in the issuer's affairs which are not disclosed in the documents
furnished;
(b) In the case of all other issuers, the information that would be required to be included in a
registration statement filed under the Act on the form which the issuer would be entitled to use,
provided, however, that:
A. the issuer may omit details or employ condensation of information if, under the circumstances, the omitted information is not material or the condensation of information does not
render the statements made misleading.
NOTE: The issuer would have the burden of proof to show that, under the circumstances,
the omitted information is not material and that any condensation does not render the
statements made misleading.
B. if the issuer does not have the audited financial statements required by such form and
cannot obtain them without unreasonable effort or expense, such financial statements may be
furnished on an unaudited basis, provided that if such unaudited financial statements are not
available and cannot be obtained without unreasonable effort or expense, the financial statements
required by Regulation A under the Act may be furnished.
C. if the financial schedules required by Part II of the registration statement have not been
prepared, they need not be furnished.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraph (e)(1)(ii)(a) and (b) of this section exhibits required to be filed
with the Commission as part of a registration statement or report need not be furnished to each
offeree or offeree representative if the contents of the exhibits are identified and such exhibits are
available pursuant to paragraph (e)(2) of this section; and
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49

access to or the offeror's furnishing of information, and the number of
(2) The issuer shall make available, during the course of the transaction and prior to sale, to
each offeree or his offeree representative(s) or both, the opportunity to ask questions of, and
receive answers from, the issuer or any person acting on its behalf concerning the terms and
conditions of the offering and to obtain any additional information, to the extent the issuer
possesses such information or can acquire it without unreasonable effort or expense, necessary to
verify the accuracy of the information obtained pursuant to paragraph (e)(l) of this section; and
(3) The issuer or any person acting on its behalf shall disclose to each offeree, in writing, prior
to sale:
(i) Any material relationship between his offeree representative(s) or its affiliates and the issuer
or its affiliates, which then exists or mutually is understood to be contemplated or which has
existed at any time during the previous two years, and any compensation received or to be
received as a result of such relationship;
(ii) That a purchaser of the securities must bear the economic risk of the investment for an
indefinite period of time because the securities have not been registered under the Act and,
therefore, cannot be sold unless they are subsequently registered under the Act or an exemption
from such registration is available; and
(iii)
The limitations on disposition of the securities set forth in paragraph (h)(2), (3), and (4) of
this section.
NOTE: Information need not be provided and opportunity to obtain additional information
need not be continued to be provided to any offeree or offeree representative who, during the
course of the transaction, indicates that he is not interested in purchasing the securities
offered, or to whom the issuer or any person acting on its behalf has determined not to sell the
securities." Id. § 230.146(e) (italics deleted).
46. "(g) Number of Purchasers.
(1) The issuer shall have reasonable grounds to believe, and after making reasonable inquiry,
shall believe, that there are no more than thirty-five purchasers of the securities of the issuer
from the issuer in any offering pursuant to the rule.
NOTE: See paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the note thereto and the Preliminary Notes as
to what may or may not constitute an offering pursuant to the rule.
(2) For purposes of computing the number of purchasers for paragraph (g)(l) of this section
only:.
(i) The following purchasers shall be excluded:
(a) Any relative or spouse of a purchaser and any relative of such spouse, who has the same
home as such purchaser, and
(b) Any trust or estate in which a purchaser or any of the persons related to him as specified in
paragraph (g)(2)(i)(a) or (c) of this section collectively have 100 percent of the beneficial interest
(excluding contingent interests);
(c) Any corporation or other organization of which a purchaser or any of the persons related
to him as specified in paragraph (g)(2)(i)(a) or (b) of this section collectively are the beneficial
owners of all the equity securities (excluding directors' qualifying shares) or equity interest; and
(d) Any person who purchases or agrees in writing to purchase for cash in a single payment or
installments, securities of the issuer in the aggregate amount of $150,000 or more.
NOTE: The issuer has to satisfy all the other provisions of the rule with respect to all
purchasers whether or not they are included in computing the number of purchasers under
Subdivision (g)(2)(i).
(ii) There shall be counted as one purchaser any corporation, partnership, association, joint
stock company, trust or unincorporated organization, except that if such entity was organized for
the specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, each beneficial owner of equity interests or
equity securities in such entity shall count as a separate purchaser.
NOTE: See Preliminary Note 5 as to other persons who are considered to be purchasers." Id. § 230.146(g) (italics deleted).
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purchasers, respectively. Paragraph (h)4 7 imposes duties on the issuer

to prevent disposition of the securities by the purchaser. Paragraph (b)
states that all of the conditions of the rule must be met to secure its

protection. Paragraph (f) 48 deals with the special problem of business
combinations, and paragraph (a) contains definitions.
47. "(h) Limitations on Disposition. The issuer and any person acting on its behalf shall
exercise reasonable care to assure that the purchasers of the securities in the offering are not
underwriters within the meaning of section 2(11) of the Act. Such reasonable care shall Include,
but not necessarily be limited to, the following:
(1) Making reasonable inquiry to determine if the purchaser is acquiring the securities for his
own account or on behalf of other persons;
(2) Placing a legend on the certificate or other document evidencing the securities stating that
the securities have not been registered under the Act and setting forth or referring to the
restrictions on transferability and sale of the securities;
(3) Issuing stop transfer instructions to the issuer's transfer agent, if any, with respect to the
securities, or, if the issuer transfers its own securities, making a notation in the appropriate
records of the issuer; and
(4) Obtaining from the purchaser a signed written agreement that the securities will not be
sold without registration under the Act or exemption therefrom.
NOTE: Paragraph (h)(4) of this section does not apply to business combinations as
described in paragraph (0 of this section. Notwithstanding the absence of a written
agreement, the securities are restricted and may not be [resold] without registration under
the Act or an exemption therefrom. The issuer for its own protection should consider,
however, obtaining such written agreement even in business combinations." Id.
§ 230.146(h) (italics deleted).
48. "(f) Business Combinations.
(1) The term 'business combination' shall mean any transaction of the type specified in
paragraph (a) of Rule 145 under the Act and any transaction involving the acquisition by one
issuer, in exchange solely for all or a part of its own or its parent's voting stock, or stock of
another issuer if, immediately after the acquisition, the acquiring issuer has control of the other
issuer (whether or not it had control before the acquisition).
(2) All the conditions of this rule except paragraph (d) and paragraph (h)(4) of this section
shall apply to business combinations.
NOTE: Notwithstanding the absence of a written agreement pursuant to paragraph
(h)(4), any securities acquired in an offering pursuant to paragraph (0 are restricted and
may not be resold without registration under the Act or an exemption therefrom.
(3) For purposes of paragraph (f) only, the issuer and any person acting on its behalf, after
making reasonable inquiry, shall have reasonable grounds to believe, and shall believe, at the
time that any plan for a business combination is submitted to security holders for their approval,
or in the case of an exchange, immediately prior to the sale, that each offeree either alone or with
his offeree representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters
that he is or they are capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment.
(4) In addition to information required by paragraphs (e) and (f)(2), the issuer shall provide, In
writing, to each offeree at the time the plan is submitted to security holders, or in the case of an
exchange, during the course of the transaction and prior to the sale, information about any terms
or arrangements of the proposed transaction relating to any security holder that are not identical
to those relating to all other security holders." Id. § 230.146(0 (italics deleted).
This revised version of paragraph (0 of the rule extends the benefits of rule 146 to business
combinations affected by an exchange of the acquiring corporation's stock for that of the acquired
corporation (a type "B" reorganization under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 368). While this change

1975]

RULES 146 AND 240

Paragraph (c), which regulates the manner of the offering, imposes a
general ban on "any form of general solicitation or general advertis49
ing," and gives specific examples of interdicted publicity activities.
Since an appeal to an undifferentiated public is obviously antithetical
to a private offering, there can be no serious objection to this portion
of the rule. 50
Paragraph (d),-5 captioned "Nature of Offerees," defines the class of
offerees and the class of purchasers capable of fending for themselves.
A capable offeree is one who
the issuer and any person acting on its behalf shall have reasonable grounds to believe
and shall believe immediately priorto naking an offer either... has such knowledge
and experience in financial and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the
merits and risks52of the prospective investment, or ... can bear the economic risk of
the investment.

Thus, capable offerees are those whom the issuer and anyone acting
on his behalf reasonably believe to be sufficiently sophisticated or
wealthy enough to withstand a total loss on the investment. A capable
purchaser is one who
immediately prior to making a sale, the issuer and any person acting on its behalf,
after making reasonable inquiry, shall have reasonable grounds to believe and shall
believe either (1).. .has the requisite knowledge and experience, or (2) [in conjunction
makes an acquisition easier for the acquiring corporation, its practical utility will depend on the
state of the economy and the willingness of the absorbed corporation's shareholders to accept
stock which' is not freely transferable. The acquiring corporation is required to be in "control" of
the acquired corporation after the acquisition. Since the control definition of the tax law (Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 368(c)) will probably be met, no problem should arise with respect to
compliance with rule 146(f)'s "control" provision. However, it is interesting to note that the rule
does not indicate whether the tax law definition, or the more flexible SEC definition (see 2 Loss,
supra note 18, at 770-83), applies. In any event, although ameliorative, this rule change is of
limited application.
49. See note 43 supra for text of rule 146(c).
50. This amended form of the rule deletes part of the original subdivision (c)(3) which
required the issuer to supply on request the information required by subdivision (e)(1) to every
person with whom written communication had been made with regard to the offering. Since every
offeree still must meet either the sophistication or wealth tests of subdivision (d), and still must
have access to or be furnished with the information required under subdivision (e), the only
effects of the amendment appear to be to excuse the issuer from repeating needlessly the offeree's
rights each time an interested offeree is contacted in writing, and to eliminate the sending of
unwanted information to an offeree who after an initial expression of interest and request for
information decides not to pursue the matter further. Since each offeree, or his representative,
must meet the sophistication test of subdivision (d), perhaps no reminder of his rights is
necessary. A requirement that the issuer give the offeree a general outline of his rights at the time
of the initial communication, however, might have been useful. In any event, the deletion of the
undertaking requirement does make the-issuer's burden lighter, but not significantly so, when the
remaining requirements of the rule are considered.
51. See note 44 supra for text of rule 146(d).
52. Rule 146 Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 2907-7 (emphasis added).
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with an offeree representative has] the requisite knowledge and experience and ...
3
person who is able to bear the economic risk of the investment.5

is a

Thus, capable purchasers include those offerees whom the issuer and
any person acting on its behalf reasonably believe to be sufficiently
sophisticated; or reasonably believe to be sufficiently wealthy and, in
conjunction with an "offeree representative, ' 5

4

sufficiently sophisti-

cated. It is important to note that wealth alone is not sufficient to
satisfy the definition of a purchaser under the rule.
Paragraph (e), in accordance with the Lively s s and Continental To6

bacco5

5 7
by onerously requiring
cases, goes beyond Ralston Purina

access to or actual furnishing of information beyond that which
registration would disclose. Paragraph (e)(2) provides:
The issuer shall make available, during the course of the transaction and prior to
sale, to each offeree or his offeree representative(s) or both, the opportunity to ask
questions of, and receive answers from, the issuer or any person acting on its behalf
concerning the terms and conditions of the offering and to obtain any additional
information, to the extent the issuer possesses such information or can acquire it
without unreasonable effort or expense, necessary to verify the accuracy of the
information obtained pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of this section . . .ss

Whether viewed as an access or an information-furnishing requirement, it should be noted that paragraph (e)(2) must be complied with
even if the offeree has available all the information which registration
would disclose. In addition, rule 146(e) adopts a variation of the
special relationship test of Continental Tobacco and the precursor SEC
release.5 9
Access can only exist by reason of the offeree's position with respect to the issuer.
Position means an employment or family relationship or economic bargaining power
the issuer in order to evaluate the
that enables the offeree to obtain information from
60
merits and risks of the prospective investment.

The accompanying release explains that the term "access" is used in
the rule in the same sense that it has been used "by courts and the
Commission in the past-to refer to the offeree's position with respect
53.
54.
55.

Id. (emphasis added).
See note 109 infra for a definition of offeree representative.
Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971). See text accompanying notes 33-34

supra.

56. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972). See text accompanying
notes 37-39 supra.
57. See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
58. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e)(2) (1975) (emphasis added). See note 45 supra for full text of rule
146(e).

59. See text accompanying note 39 supra; note 41 supra and accompanying text.
60.

17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e) (1975); see note 45 supra.
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53

to the issuer."6 However, the same release also states that "the
Commission is of the view that an offeree need not be an insider such
as an officer or director of the issuer in order to have access to
information. '6 2 Theoretically, then, the SEC has rejected Continental
Tobacco's "insider" special relationship test. Practically, however, the
rejection is meaningless since in applying only to those employees,
family members and wealthy people who already have enough clout to
compel the issuer to give them the same information as registration
would disclose, 63 the access requirement protects only those who do
not even need its protection. In creating this situation the release and
note do little to reduce "uncertainty" or provide "more objective stan' 64
dards.
Because the determination of who possesses this requisite power
relationship can be made only after the fact, the only safe alternative

for an issuer appears to be to furnish the information and not rely on
"access" as a substitute. This means, as a practical matter, that the
issuer must prepare a registration statement. 65 In fact, since the issuer
61. Rule 146 Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 2907-8.
62. Id. at 2907-3.
63. This is consistent with Ralston Purina which held, to use the new language, that ordinary
employees did not have the requisite relationship. See text accompanying note 23 supra. Thus,
only top level employees (query exactly which) will meet the requirement.
64. Compare Rosenfeld, supra note 7, with Kripke, supra note 7. "In considering the access
concept, it is helpful to note that the Commission, in defining access, has retreated from its
position in SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., where the Commission argued that only an
insider could have access. The concept as it exists under Rule 146 makes it clear and perhaps
relatively easy for an institution or venture capital firm to possess sufficient economic bargaining
power to be an access offeree." Rosenfeld 206 (italics deleted) (footnote omitted). "This new concept
of'clout' merely compounds but does notsolve the difficulties of the access concept. How does anyone
have any bargaining power with an issuer except to be able to say that if the issuer does not tell him
what he wants to know, he will not make the investment? In that sense everyone has clout, and no
one has special clout, with the possible rare exceptions of major suppliers and customers, and
perhaps some limited number of the largest institutional investors whose participation isso necessary
in major financial deals that they have special clout. Thus this change in itself takes us nowhere.
"But the Commission adds as an alternative to access under the Rule the furnishing of
information equivalent to that on the appropriate registration form. The result, of course, is that
the unviable requirement of access will be forgotten in all but very rare cases under the Rule and
the furnishing of information will be substituted." Kripke 6, col. 3 (italics deleted).
65. Rule 146(e) requires an issuer not subject to the 1934 Act reporting requirements to
furnish each offeree (or his offeree representative), unless the offeree has "access" to the
information, with "the same kind of information that is specified in Schedule A." Schedule A to
the 1933 Act, which sets forth the contents of the registration statement, sets forth thirty-two required
items, ranging from the name of the issuer to copies of significant documents. It, of course, includes
the familiar prospectus. Its preparation is a highly specialized art, the prime function of the highly
specialized and expensive securities bar. For guides to the preparation of registration statements see
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5278 (July 26, 1972), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. 78,888; SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9, 1968), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 77,636.
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must comply with the additional requirements of paragraph (e)(2), the
burden ultimately is greater than registration. Furthermore, because
no one can say with certainty how much additional information is
enough under paragraph (e)(2), attempted compliance becomes even
more risky than a registered offering.
Reporting companies ordinarily can afford the costs of full registration. 66 The economic burden of rule 146 disclosure thus falls most
heavily on the smaller issuers. 6 7 Newly formed businesses will have
the highest proportional burden since presumably they will have to
68
prepare at least the mini S-2 registration statement.
There is an exception from these access and information-furnishing
requirements for issuers required to report under the 1934 Act. 69 There
is also an ameliorative provision for non-reporting issuers.70 The latter
Rosenfeld combines the "substantial employee time and money to explain the terms of an
offering or verify information obtained or furnished" (Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 207) with the cost of
the offeree representative and concludes that "flor most small issues, as well as most small issuers,
the conditions and requirements set forth in the Rule will cause legal, accounting, and the issuer's
internal expenses to be too large." Id. at 212. See also Alberg & Lybecker, supra note 7, at 643. See
generally SEC Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01 et seq. (1975), which sets forth the SEC accounting
requirements.
66. Issuers required to report under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1970), are those who have already had a registered public offering under section 5 of
the Securities Act of 1933, id. § 77(e), or who have registered under section 12 of the 1934 Act. Id. §
781(a). Section 12(b) covers securities listed on a stock exchange. Id. § 781(b). Section 12(g) requires
registration by issuers who have total assets exceeding $1,000,000 and a class of unexempt equity
security held of record by 500 or more persons. Id. § 781(g).
67. They will not have to pay the underwriter's spread, and may save some printing costs. They
also will not have to pay the statutory registration fee, Securities Act of 1933 § 6(b), id. § 77f(b),
but this is a relatively minor expense. Significant legal and accounting fees will undoubtedly be
incurred. The excuse from furnishing audited financial statements where the issuer "cannot obtain
them without unreasonable effort or expense" is discussed at note 70 infra. Unaudited financlals
are, of course, less expensive than audited ones, and would normally have to be prepared, anyhow,
for tax purposes. See rule 1-02(d), 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-02(d) (1975), for a definition of audit.
68. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e)(1)(ii)(b) (1975). Form S-2, although requiring fewer items than the
more frequently used S-1 form, requires that all financial statements be certified. See rule 1-02, 17
C.F.R. § 210.1-02(fl (1975), for a definition of certified. Unless this requirement is excused, furnishing
the information which form S-2 would disclose will probably cost the issuer as much or more than
furnishing the S-1 information. Form S-3 is provided for promotional-stage issuers in mineral
exploration, development or exploitation (other than oil or gas). Very small new ventures, needing
less than $100,000, will, fortunately, be able to rely on rule 240, rather than rule 146, thus avoiding
problems underparagraph (e). See text accompanying notes 136-164 infra for a discussion of rule 240.
69. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e)(1)(ii)(c) (1975); see note 45 supra.
70. The addition of subdivision (e)(1)(ii)(a)(2) regarding the information requirement for Issuers
notsubjectto the reporting requirements of the 1934 Actisperhaps the most important of the rule 146
amendments. Non-reporting issuers--smaller, expanding businesses--are perhaps the most important ones to encourage in the present state of the economy, and should certainly be the peculiar
concern of any private placement rule. The amended rule continues the basic requirement that tie
information furnished to offerees be the same as that in a registration statement, but makes it clear
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eases the burden on non-reporting issuers somewhat by excusing them
from furnishing certain financial statements. However, the new permission for non-reporting issuers to condense or omit certain registration
statement items 71 does not ease the burden and is a trap for the
unwary.
Paragraph (g) modifies the SEC's pre-Raiston Purina rule of thumb
as to the number of permissible offerees 7 2 (twenty-five) by increasing
the number to thirty-five and by making it applicable to purchasers
instead of offerees, which is a step in the right direction. The thirtyfive need not include the purchaser's spouse, relatives living in the
same home, trusts, estates and corporations in which they have the
entire interest, or purchasers of $150,000 worth of securities. 73 However, a recent change in the note to subdivision (g)(2)(i) makes it clear
that all of the sophistication, information, etc., requirements apply to
all purchasers even though they need not be counted in the thirty-five
investor maximum.
Prior to the amendment of the rule, the purchaser maximum was
absolute. Although the issuer was (and still is) required to take
precautions against re-transfers, including making a "reasonable inquiry to determine if the purchaser is acquiring the securities for his
own account or on behalf of other persons,
the SEC concedes that
"the issuer, even if it had exercised good faith and reasonable care in
determining how many purchasers there were, would lose the Rule
if the issuer had sold securities to thirty-five persons and one of
the purchasers had deceived the issuer and had in fact purchased the
securities for other accounts. '75 In order to forestall such a loss of the
exemption, the amendment deletes the absolute maximum of thirty-five
purchasers and provides instead that "[t]he issuer shall have reasonable
grounds to believe, and after making reasonable inquiry, shall believe,
that the financial schedules called for in part II of the registration statement need not be furnished to
an offeree if the issuer has not prepared such schedules. It also relaxes the requirements as to financial
statements by allowing an issuer to substitute regulation A financial statements (see Form I-A,
Schedule I, Item 11, P-H Sec. Reg. Guide 4102) for the audited and unaudited financial statements
in the form required by a registration statement where the ordinary required financials are not
available without "unreasonable effort or expense." Again, the problem inheres in the vagueness of
the excuse. Lastly, the amending release makes it clear that areg. A offering circular will not suffice.
Non-reporting issuers will normally have to comply with this information section of the rule.
Accordingly, the amendment, except for the uncertain relaxation as to financials, does little to lessen
the burden of providing each offeree, in effect, with a registration statement.
71.
72.

See text accompanying note 130 infra.
See text accompanying notes 19 & 41 supra.

73.

17 C.F.R. § 230.146(g)(2)(i) (1975).

74.
75.

Id. § 230.146(h)(1).
Rule 146 Amending Release, supra note 10.
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that there are no more than thirty-five purchasers.... ",76 This language,
hopefully, will be interpreted in light of its purpose of providing greater
protection to the issuer. However, on its face it introduces the same
uncertain standards ("reasonable grounds to believe," "reasonable inquiry") that are characteristic of the rule as a whole and represent one of
77
its principal defects.
Paragraph (h) requires the issuer and any person acting on its behalf
to exercise "reasonable
care" to assure that the purchasers are not
"underwriters," 78 and sets forth the minimum that the issuer must do
to meet its obligation of preventing a distribution. The release explains
the requirement:
[T]he issuer and any person acting on its behalf must take reasonable care to assure

that the purchasers are not underwriters. Such reasonable care shall include but is not
necessarily limited to (1) making reasonable inquiry to determine if the purchaser is
purchasing for his own account or on behalf of others; (2) placing a legend on the

certificates or other documents evidencing the securities indicating that they were not
registered and setting forth or referring to the restrictions on transferability and sale;
(3) issuing stop transfer instructions to the restrictions [sic] on transferability and
appropriate notation in the issuer's records if the issuer transfers its own securities; and
(4) except as provided in subparagraph (f)(2), obtaining a written agreement from the
purchaser that the securities will not be resold without registration or exemption
therefrom. The Commission believes that these limitations are necessary in order to

protect7 9the public from a deferred distribution. They are also in the self interest of the
issuer.

The SEC, from its earliest days, 80 has been legitimately concerned
that an exempt transaction will somehow be converted into a public
distribution without the investor protection which registration gives.
Its bate noir has always been the one or two purchasers who take an
entire issue under an exemption and then divide their unregistered
securities into smaller parcels which they sell to the gullible public
without any of the disclosures required for registered offerings (and
frequently by means of the fraudulent practices the Act was designed
to prevent). An obvious way to forestall the danger is to prevent the
second step. This led to the pre-rule requirement that all original
purchasers in a private placement could take only for investment. 8 1
Thus was born the "investment letter" under which the initial purchaser in effect agreed that he would not sell.
Such a letter obviously should not prevent the SEC from stopping
76.

17 C.F.R. § 230.146(g)(1) (1975).

77.
78.
79.
80.

See text accompanying notes 115 & 129 infra.
See note 47 supra.
Rule 146 Adopting Release, supra note 7.
See In Re Unity Gold Corp., 3 S.E.C. 618 (1938).

81.

The Wheat Report 160-77. See also Rule 146 Adopting Release, supra note 7.
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the distribution where the signers have no intention of abiding by it.
Accordingly, the SEC has ruled:
Counsel and their issuer and underwriter clients cannot base a claim to exemption
from registration under the Securities Act upon the mere acceptance at face value of
representations by purchasers that they take for investment and disclaim responsibility
for investigation and consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances pertinent to
a determination that the transactions do not involve a public offering. A representation
by a purchaser that he is taking for "investment" when in fact he concurrently is
dividing a participation among others or reselling a portion of a commitment to others
is worthless. Issuers, underwriters or counsel cannot claim that a transaction does not
involve a public offering if they do not know the identity and number of initial offerees
or purchasers or whether such purchasers offer and sell to others.8 12

Moreover, even though all of the original purchasers sincerely agreed
not to transfer their shares,8 3 an offering to a large number of initial
purchasers should not, as a policy matter, be automatically exempt;
otherwise an offering could be made to everyone in the country,
provided he agreed to sign, and there would probably never be
another registered offering. The Continental Tobacco 84 case went
further, however, and held that even conclusive evidence that the
purchase was for the purpose of investment would not, standing alone,
be sufficient to sustain a private offering exemption, even where the
number of offerees was quite limited.
Rule 146, in effect, follows the Continental Tobacco case by requir6
ing5 three devices that previously had been merely recommended:
agreement not to distribute, formerly called an "investment letter;" a
legend on the share certificates restricting transfer; and a stop transfer
order to the transfer agent. Furthermore, compliance with these three
required devices does not assure exemption, even where the number of
investors is limited, because the SEC additionally requires that the
issuer make "reasonable inquiry to determine if the purchaser is
acquiring the securities for his own account or on behalf of other
persons."'87 Moreover, even these four safeguards are insufficient
82. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957).
[1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 76,539. See also SEC v. Mono-Kearsarge
Consol. Mining Co., 167 F. Supp. 248 (D. Utah 1958).
83. Such an absolute prohibition on transfer generally would be unenforceable. 8 W. Fletcher,
Cyclopedia of Private Corporations § 4205 (perm. ed. 1966).
84. SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); see text accompanying notes
37-39 supra.
85. 17 C.F.R § 230.146(h) (1975).
86. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5121 (Dec. 30, 1970), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
2784.
87. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(h) (1975). An earlier release, SEC Security Act Release No. 4552 (Nov.
6, 1962), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 2777, referred to the three standard devices as"only precautions
and... not to be regarded as a basis for exemption from registration." Rule 146 thus returns to the
theory and uncertainty of that release.
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under rule 146, since it states that the reasonable care required by the
issuer to assure that the purchasers are not underwriters "shall include,
but not necessarily be limited to" these safeguards. And in addition to
these rule 146(h) requirements, the issuer must also fulfill the rule 146
(e) requirement that it inform each offeree in writing that the securities
are restricted and may not be resold unless registered or exempted from
registration. s8
There can be no objection to requiring the issuer to take reasonable
steps to insure that the original purchasers do not convert the private
placement into a public offering, provided that the "reasonable steps"
are specified. However, in imposing non-distribution requirements
beyond the three standard precautions, rule 146 is more restrictive
than other recent rules.8 9 Whether such restrictiveness is warranted is
questionable, especially in light of the over-all restrictiveness of the
rule.
Sufficient protections against wide-scale public distributions are provided by the limitation on the number of initial purchasers, coupled
with the legend, stop transfer and agreement not to resell requirements, especially since these requirements are effectively enforceable
against the original purchasers.
In the first place, few people are likely to purchase legended
securities. Secondly, the original purchasers are unlikely to attempt
such a sale unless they have complied with the quantity limitations and
88. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (e)(3)(ii)-(iii) (1975). See note 45 supra. There is nothing objectionable
about this requirement, except its conjunction with so many others.
89. E.g., the intrastate exemption rule, rule 147, 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1975), provides in
pertinent part:
"(f) Precautions Against Interstate Offers and Sales.
(1) The issuer shall, in connection with any securities.sold by it pursuant to this rule:
(i) Place a legend on the certificate or other document evidencing the security stating that the
securities have not been registered under the Act and setting forth the limitations on resale contained
in paragraph (e);
(ii) Issue stop transfer instructions to the issuer's transfer agent, if any, with respect to the
securities, or, if the issuer transfers its own securities make a notation in the appropriate records of
the issuer; and
(iii) Obtain a written representation from each purchaser as to his residence.
(2) The issuer shall, in connection with the issuance of new certificates for any of the securities that
are part of the same issue that are presented for transfer during the time period specified in paragraph
(e), take the steps required by paragraphs (f)(1)(i) and (ii).
(3) The issuer shall, in connection with any offers, offers to sell, offers for sale or sales by It
pursuant to this rule, disclose, in writing, the limitations on resale contained in paragraph (e) and the
provisions of paragraphs (f)(1)(i) and (ii) and paragraph (f)(2)." (italics deleted).
It is, to say the least, incongruous to require, as rule 146 does, more safeguards against
redistribution in an offering limited to thirty-five purchasers than one in which the initial purchasers
theoretically may number thousands, or in some cases, millions.
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holding period requirements of either rule 23790 or 144, 9 1 which make
a public offering a practical impossibility.
Rule 237(a) excludes sales through brokers from its "Exemption of
certain securities owned for five years." Since a wide scale distribution
is effectively impossible without the assistance of a broker, and since
the SEC has control over brokers anyway9 2 an illicit public distribution under rule 237 is difficult to transact.
Rule 144 regulates distribution of restricted securities, such as rule
146 securities, and defines "[p]ersons deemed not to be engaged in a
distribution and therefore not underwriters" as those who comply with
the various conditions imposed by the rule. By implication, failure to
comply with rule 144 will make the original purchaser an underwriter
and hence subject to the civil and criminal penalties of the Act if he
sells in violation of the rule. Obviously, this should deter original
purchasers of rule 146 securities from engaging in a wide-scale public
distribution of the securities.
Lastly, an improper resale not only might make the seller an
underwriter, but might even destroy the exempt status of the original
issuance, making the issuer guilty of violating the Act. 9 3 Therefore, few
issuers are likely to allow transfer of rule 146 securities without proof of
compliance with either rule 237 or rule 144.
In light of the foregoing it is clear that under ordinary circumstances
the legend, stop transfer and agreement not to resell requirements
should be sufficient safeguards against redistribution. This reasoning
has been adopted by section 227(b) of the proposed ALI Federal
Securities Code which provides:
(b) [Limited offering.] (1) A "limited offering" is one in which the following conditions are
90. Id. § 230.237, adopted in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5224 (Jan. 10, 1972). (1971-1972
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 78,484.
91. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1975), adopted in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972).
1CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 78,487. Rule 144(c) has an availability of information requirement which
affords private placement purchasers almost as much protection as would be afforded by registration. Issuers required to report under the 1934 Act must keep their filed reports current. Issuers not
required to report must make "publicly available" considerable information, including their most
recent financial statements. Thus, ifall public transfers of private placement securities are under rule
144, ample protection would seem to be afforded the public.
92. See, e.g., Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1959); rule 15c2-11, 17
C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (1975), under the 1934 Act, restricting the quotations necessary to make a
market; SEC Securities Act Release Nos. 5168 & 9239 (July 7, 1971), 2 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
22,760, cautioning broker-dealers that they will be held responsible unless they exercise great care
to make sure they do not aid a public distribution of unregistered securities. See 3A H. Bloomenthal.
Securities and Federal Corporate Law § 12.05 (3], as to rule 15c2-11.
93. See Crowel-Collier Publishing Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957),
[1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 76,539. Butsee 1 Loss, supra note 18, at 552
n.309.
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satisfied: (A) the initial buyers of the securities are institutional investors or not more than
thirty-five other persons or both; (B) resales of any of the securities ... three years after the
last sale to any of the initial buyers.. . do not result in more than thirty-five owners of
those securities (apart from any institutional investors and persons who become owners
otherwise than by purchase) at any one time, unless the resales are pursuant to an offering
statement, a distribution statement, or an exemption; and (C) the original offeror and all
sellers in such resales comply with any rules adopted under paragraph (4).94

It must be conceded that this proposed code section would ignore
both the need for protection of the original purchasers and the Ralston
Purina tests. That case, therefore, effectively would be overruled. A
proposal that the SEC adopt proposed section 227(b) as its rule is not
quite as radical as it might appear at first glance, however. First, the
Ralston Purina Court itself indicated that it was not clear that
Congress intended the protective restrictions imposed by that decision. 9 5 A fortiori there could not have been clear congressional intent
to support the embellishments of the subsequent lower court decisions.
Second, the "permissiveness" of the proposed section is not without
precedent: the intrastate offering exemption of section 3(a)(11) of the
1933 Act, 96 even as interpreted by the SEC, 9 7 theoretically permits an
offering to millions of people without any proof of their sophistication or
access to information, provided only that all are residents of the same
state as the issuer, resales to non-residents are restricted, and 80% of the
proceeds of the offering are to be used in that state. 98 This intrastate
offering exemption, in contrast to the private placement exemption, does
not turn on a "need ... for the protections afforded by registration" test. 99
When the burdens of complying with rule 146 are considered, the
wisdom of adopting section 227(b), or at least some rule midway
between section 227(b) and rule 146, becomes clear, despite the
diminished protection to the original purchasers. New rule 240100 .is
94. ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 227(b) (Rep.'s Rev. of Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-3, 1974). Section 502(b) of
the proposed Code makes it unlawful for an offeror or reseller to engage in "general advertising" in a
limited offering. The new Code is being prepared under the direction of Louis Loss, the acknowl.
edged dean of securities lawyers, to replace the 1933 and 1934 Acts. See also Victor & Bedrlck,
Private Offering: Hazards for the Unwary, 45 Va. L. Rev. 869, 882 (1959), suggesting an exemption
for offerings to 100 or fewer persons, where an investment agreement is given by the purchaser, and
the seller does not have reason to believe that resales will be attempted within two years.
95. 346 U.S. at 122.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1970).
97. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1975); see note 16 supra.
98. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1975). For prior SEC thinking on the subject see SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4434 (Dec. 6, 1961), 1 CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. V 2270.
99. See text accompanying notes 24-25 & 34 supra.
100. See text accompanying notes 136-164 infra. It is anomalous that SEC reg. A, 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.251-263 (1975), was not amended when rule 240 was adopted. For example, rule 240
prohibits general advertising (although it does permit unlimited personal solicitation of offerees so
long as the number of beneficial owners does not exceed 100 and the amount raised does not
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not such a satisfactory midway point. It allows a much larger number
of purchasers than proposed section 22 7(b), but any advantage ensuing
from this is offset by the disadvantage of uncertainty as to transferability of shares by the original purchasers. This is antithetical to what is
needed.
If U.S. Steel should decide to borrow $3,000,000 in a private
placement, it would not have much of a problem complying with rule
146. The corporation would merely approach a few large insurance
companies or banks (they will presumably have "such knowledge and
experience in financial and business matters that they [would be]
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment" and be "able to bear the economic risk of investment"), staple
its 1934 Act filings into an offering circular, deliver the package to
each offeree, answer any relevant questions, show any other financial
reports, allow any examination or audits the offerees might desire, and
include language in the loan agreement to prevent assignment of the
obligation, etc. as required by paragraph (h) of rule 146. It could even
make the offer (accompanied, of course, by the information) to an
unlimited number of such sophisticated institutions, provided that it
required each purchaser to commit itself to at least a $150,000 partici10 1
pation.
However, at the other end of the financial spectrum, compliance
with rule 146 would be an almost impossible financial burden. For
example, if a New Jersey resident decided he wanted to raise even a
very small amount of money, say $10,000, for his New York business,
and he approached his next door neighbor, a dentist, to invest, he
would have to make an initial inquiry to determine whether or not the
dentist had the requisite knowledge and experience in business matters, 10 2 and presumably would have to make sure that the dentist
exceed $100,000). However, the restrictiveness of this ban on advertising is infinitesimal
compared to the requirements imposed on reg. A users. See, e.g., rules 253, 256 & 257, 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.253, 230.256 & 230.257 (1975), requiring an offering circular for all offerings over $50,000
and some offerings under that amount; rule 255, id. § 230.255, requiring the filing of a
"notification;" rule 256 (a)(2), id. § 230.256 (a)(2), requiring delivery of the offering circular, rule
258, id. § 230.258, requiring filing of sales materials; rule 260, id. § 230.260, requiring a sales
report. This disparity of treatment between rule 240 and reg. A is yet another indication of the
need for synchronism in the drafting of the various SEC exemptive rules.
Cf. Coles, An Introduction to Regulation A: Small Business Financing Exemption, 56 Chi. B.
Rec. 34 (1974), which cautions that a public offering under reg. A may be preferable to reliance
on rule 146 (or rule 147) because "[tihe stringent criteria of [those] exemptions frequently makes
them unavailable or makes reliance on them uncertain." Id. This itself is a sad commentary on the
draftsmanship of the private placement rule.
101. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(g)(2)(i)(d) (1975).
102. Dentists as well as doctors are not per se sufficiently sophisticated. See SEC v.
Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

could stand the loss (query whether he would have to ask the dentist to
give him a statement of his net worth, which request would probably
not only queer the deal, but might end in the erection of a "spitefence"1 0 3), pay the added legal and accounting fees to prepare the
mini-registration statement, and give the dentist all the interesting
inside information about the business (perhaps, if a partnership
were involved, also a similar net worth statement). If the dentist didn't
buy, he would have to repeat this procedure with each offeree, making
certain, at his peril, that 4each met all of the sophistication and
10
information requirements.

It is no answer to the small businessman's problem that the SEC
would probably not bother him. People today are less apt to shrug off
a loss as part of the risks of investment. When the security goes sour
they suddenly become sophisticated enough to sue, even though they
were financially unsophisticated enough to buy. 0 5- Rule 146 is not
exclusive, but if it is not complied with the issuer must rely on either
the "administrative and judicial interpretations in effect at the time of
the transactions,"' 1 6 the uncertainty of which was the very reason for
adoption of the rule, or on rule 240. And even if the small businessman is
fortunate enough to secure a no-action letter, this will not bar his litigious
0 7
former friend from recovery.1
103. But see Paradise Valley Property, SEC No-action letter (available June 5, 1972), where
the offerees did supply their net worth.
104. The SEC cautions: "The courts and the Commission have consistently held that one
claiming an exemption under Section 4(2) of the Act has the burden of proving that the exemption
is available to him and the Rule does not shift that burden. In addition, it should be pointed out
that the burden of proof applies with respect to each offeree and not just to the purchasers of the
securities. See Lively v. Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971). Accordingly, any issuer who
relies on the Rule has the burden of establishing that it has satisfied all the conditions of the Rule.
Such issuer for its own protection should obtain and retain in its files written evidence that would
assist in meeting this evidentiary burden." (italics omitted). Rule 146 Adopting Release, supra
note 7.
105. See Repass v. Rees, 174 F. Supp. 898 (D. Colo. 1959), where rescission was granted on
the ground that the offering was public, despite the fact that apparently only thirteen persons had
purchased and plaintiffs were sophisticated businessmen. See also Henderson v. Hayden, Stone Inc.,
461 F.2d 1069(5th Cir. 1972), a successful suit for rescission by a single sophisticated purchaser; Hill
York Corp. v. Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971), again involving only thirteen
purchasers who were sophisticated businessmen and lawyers. Apparently many rescission claims are
settled by the defendants to avoid suit. See Schneider & Zall, Section 12(1) and the Imperfect Exempt
Transaction: the Proposed I & I Defense, 28 Bus. Law. 1011, 1013 (1973). See also SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 125 n.l1.
106. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1975), Preliminary Note 1. See also Rule 146 Adopting Release,
supra note 7.
107. Such No-action letters will be difficult to come by, since the release adopting rule 146
states that "[a]lthough the staff will continue to consider no action requests relating to Section 4(2)
of the Act, such letters will only be issued infrequently and only in the most compelling
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The problem is that apparently rule 146 was drawn up with the
"almost-public" offering in mind. But fortunately, in the example
given, our small businessman can utilize rule 240. If, however, instead
of $10,000 he needs over $100,000-a not unlikely prospect in today's
inflation-rule 240 will be unavailable and rule 146 will be his only
effective alternative.
The judicial decisions were well on the way to destroying the private
placement exemption. 10 8 By largely codifying those decisions rule 146
has done nothing to reverse this unfortunate trend. Unfortunately, too,
as will be indicated below, those who can rely on rule 240 will find it
too is not a really satisfactory solution to their securities law problems.
IV.

UNCERTAINTIES UNDER RULE

146

It could be argued solely on the basis of the difficulties of compliance, that rule 146 fails to achieve its purpose of reducing uncertainty, since so many businessmen will have to forego dependence on it
as a justification for their exemption. Even if a draconian law can be
"certain" in the sense that its harsh requirements are clear, the new
rule fails in its goal.
There are a number of vague provisions in the new rule which seem
almost certain to cause interpretive difficulties, litigation, and, worst
of all, unanticipated liability. Some are of minor significance. Others,
unfortunately, are major.
Some of the more minor ones appear in the definition of a qualified
"offeree representative." 10 9 As indicated above, the sophistication recircumstances." Rule 146 Adopting Release, supra note 7. As with rule 144, the Commission will
issue interpretive letters to assist persons in complying with the new rule.
The same policy applies to rule 240 transactions. See Rule 240 Adopting Release, supra note is.
108. The Disappearing Private Offering Exemption?, BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 144, at B-1
(Mar. 22, 1972).
109. Rule 146(a)(1) provides:
"(1) Offeree Representative. The term 'offeree representative' shall mean any person or persons,
each of whom the issuer and any person acting on its behalf, after making reasonable inquiry, have
reasonable grounds to believe and believe satisfies all of the following conditions:
(i) Is not an affiliate, director, officer or other employee of the issuer, or beneficial owner of 10
percent or more of any class of the equity securities or 10 percent or more of the equity interest in the
issuer, except where the offeree is:
(a) Related to such person by blood, marriage or adoption, no more remotely than as first cousin;
(b) Any trust or estate in which such person or any persons related to him as specified in paragraph
(a)(1)(i)(a) or (c) of this section collectively have 100 percent of the beneficial interest (excluding
contingent interests) or of which any such person serves as trustee, executor, or in any similar
capacity, or
(c) Any corporation or other organization in which such person or any persons related to him as
specified in paragraph (aX1)(i)(a) or (b) of this section collectively are the beneficial owners of 100
percent of the equity securities (excluding directors' qualifying shares) or equity interest;
(ii) Has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he, either alone, or
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quirement can be satisfied by the offeree's employing a competent
offeree representative where the offeree is able to bear the economic
risk of investment. 10 This might be called the "rich widow provision."
Generally, the offeree representative is required to be independent of
the issuer (which, of course, makes sense), i.e., he should not be an
"affiliate, director, officer or other employee of the issuer, or beneficial
owner of 10 percent or more of any class of the equity securities or 10
percent or more of the equity interest in the issuer ...

."I" "Affiliate"

but somewhat indefinite language known to
is defined in the familiar,
2
lawyers."1
all securities
Apart from a few minor exceptions to the independence rule, the
requisites for a qualified offeree representative generally are stiff,
including a requirement that he disclose in writing any "material
relationship" with the issuer.' 13 "Material" is defined in the Mills-Ute
sense (the test which gives nightmares to defendants' securities
lawyers) as "any relationship that a reasonable investor might consider
1114 The courts have been quite generous in finding
important ....
together with other offeree representatives or the offeree, is capable of evaluating the merits and risks
of the prospective investment;
(iii) Is acknowledged by the offeree, in writing, during the course of the transaction, to be his
offeree representative in connection with evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
investment; and
(iv) Discloses to the offeree, in writing, prior to the acknowledgment specified in paragraph
(a)(1)(iii) of this section, any material relationship between such person or its affiliates and the Issuer
orits affiliates, which then exists oris mutually understood to be contemplated or which has existed at
any time during the previous two years, and any compensation received or to be received as a result of
such relationship.
NOTE 1: Persons acting as offeree representatives should consider the applicability of the
registration and anti-fraud provisions relating to brokers and dealers under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 and relating to investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
NOTE 2: The acknowledgment required by paragraph (a)(l)(iii) of this section and the disclosure
required by paragraph (a)(1)(iv) of this section must be made with specific reference to each
prospective investment. Advance blanket acknowledgment, such as for "all securities transactions"
or "all private placements", is not sufficient.
NOTE 3: Disclosure of any material relationships between the offeree representative or Its
affiliates and the issuer or its affiliates does not relieve the offeree representative of its obligation to act
in the interest of the offeree." 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(a)(1) (1975) (italics deleted).
110. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
111. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(a)(1)(i) (1975), supra note 109.
112. Id. § 230.146(a)(3) provides that "[tihe term 'affiliate' of a person means a person that
directly or indirectly through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under
common control with such person."
113. Id. § 230.146(a)(1)(iv), supra note 109.
114. Id. § 230.146(a)(4) (emphasis added); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970),
using the test under section 14 of the 1934 Act; accord, Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), applying the test under rule lob-5. The same vague "might" standard
probably will be applied soon in all securities acts contexts, Cf. ALI Fed. Sec. Code § 256(a) (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1973).
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undisclosed information "material" under this and less liberal
tests, and it is quite possible that friendship with the issuer's president,
membership in the same country club, hiring the same brokerage
firm, or perhaps merely knowing an ordinary employee of the issuer,
will be considered a "material relationship" under this test. It is
obvious that the test is vague, and this is a very charitable characterization.
The significance of this vagueness appears in the requirement that
"the issuer and any person acting on its behalf" must, "after making
reasonable inquiry, have reasonable grounds to believe and [in fact]
believe" that the offeree representative meets all of the enumerated
conditions. 115 Thus, if an offeree representative does not make the
requisite disclosure to his client, not only is he in trouble, but the
issuer may find that it has lost its exemption. This hardly removes
uncertainty. Fortunately, most small issuers, at least, can avoid such
an occurrence by restricting their offers to persons who themselves
meet the sophistication test. 116 Therefore, the deficiency of the term
"material," while undesirable, is not fatal here.'1 7
Another of the less important deficiencies appears in the exceptions
to the general ban on advertising." 8 Seminars and circulars are
permitted, but only if the persons solicited thereby meet the sophistication test of the rule. The deficiency here is the incorporation of the
extremely vague sophistication test. But here, too, any problem can be
avoided by omitting seminars and written communications except
those required under the rule. 1 19
A minor uncertainty in a significant provision is the use of the word
"similar" in what the SEC characterizes as the "safe harbor" provision
of paragraph (b)(1). That paragraph provides:
this rule only, an offering shall be deemed not to include offers,
offers to sell, offers for sale or sales of securities of the issuer pursuant to the
exemptions provided by Section 3 or Section 4(2) of the Act or pursuant to a
registration statement filed under the Act, that take place prior to the six-month period
immediately preceding or after the six-month period immediately following any offers,
offers for sale or sales pursuant to this rule, Provided, That there are during neither of said
six-month periods any offers, offers for sale or sales of securities by or for the issuer of the
same or similar class as those offered, offered for sale or sold pursuant to the rule.110
(1) For purposes of

115. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(a)(1) (1975).
116. The term "sophistication" is used here as shorthand for the test imposed by rule 146(d)
which allows an offer to the unsophisticated wealthy, but requires sophistication, at least of the
offeree's representative, before a sale can be made.
117. But in the context of rule 146(e)(2), the materiality deficiency may well prove to be a trap for
the unwary. For a discussion of this serious deficiency see text accompanying note 130 infra.
118.
119.
120.

17 C.F.R. § 230.146(c)(2) (1975), supra note 43.
Id. § 230.146(a)(1)(iv), (e), (0(4).
Id. § 230.146(b)(1).
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If securities of the same or a similar class are offered within the two
six-month periods, the customary, imprecise integration rules will apply. 121
A more serious problem is to establish when the offering period
"pursuant to this rule" begins and ends, since this fixes the limits of the
six-month periods on either side. The rule as adopted does not require
any filing,1 2 2 so the determination of when the offering period begins
and ends is a question of fact. The rule (again demonstrating that it
was drafted with the "almost-public" offering in mind) seems to
presuppose a single offer to all of the offerees at the same time,
something which frequently does not occur in a legitimate private
placement in which the issuer must sometimes go from one offeree to
another before his terms are accepted.
The uncertainty might have been resolved by defining "offering" or
"offering pursuant to the rule" in quantitative terms, or by requiring a
filing at the commencement and termination of the offering. Although
the rule, again, engenders uncertainty, the problem can be avoided by
permitting no other offers of any kind within six months of either
extreme of the private placement.
As indicated above, "access" requires that the offeree have a "position" (the Continental Tobacco "relationship") with the issuer. "Position" "means an employment or family relationship or economic bargaining power that enables the offeree to obtain information from the
issuer in order to evaluate the merits and risks of the prospective
121. A note to rule 146(b)(1) provides: "NOTE: In the event that securities of the same or
similar class as those offered pursuant to the rule are offered, offered for sale or sold less than six
months prior to or subsequent to any offer, offer for sale or sale pursuant to the rule, see
Preliminary Note 3 hereof as to which offers, offers to sell, offers for sale or sales may be deemed
to be part of the offering." (italics deleted). Preliminary Note 3 states: "The term 'offering' Is not
defined in the rule. The determination as to whether offers, offers to sell, offers for sale, or sales
of securities are part of an offering (i.e., are deemed to be 'integrated') depends on the particular
facts and circumstances. See Securities Act Release No. 4552 (November 6, 1962) [CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep.] 5590. All offers, offers tosell, offers for sale, or sales which are partof an offering must
meet all of the conditions of Rule 146 for the rule to be available. Release 33-4552 indicates that In
determining whether offers and sales should be regarded as a part of a larger offering and thus should
be integrated, the following factors should be considered: (a) whether the offerings are part of a
single plan of financing; (b) whether the offerings involve issuance of the same class of security; (c)
whether the offerings are made at or about the same time; (d) whether the same type of consideration
is to be received; and (e) whether the offerings are made for the same general purpose."
122. As the Commission points out in Rule 146 Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 2907-10, the
proposed version of rule 146(i), found in SEC Securities Act Release No. 5430(Oct. 10, 1973), [1973
Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. V 79,529, required a report of sales. The requirement was
deleted in the rule as adopted because it was felt that it "would unnecessarily increase the difficulty of
complying with the Rule for many small issuers." While this is true, such a requirement could make
for greater certainty, which might outweigh the burden. Compare rule 240(h), 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.240(h) (1975) (Notice of sales requirement), with the proposed version of rule 146(1).
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investment. ' 123 This test is so vague that the only safe course for the
issuer is to furnish the information; otherwise the plaintiff's failure to
get the information may be viewed by the courts as proof that he
didn't have "access" to it. Here the rule is more egregious because it
not only does not diminish uncertainty, it creates uncertainty.
Another significantly vague provision is paragraph (h) which deals
with the issuer's obligation to guard against re-transfers. The precautions
against re-transfer must include, but are "not necessarily ...limited to,"
those enumerated in the rule. 124 Certainty requires that the list be
exclusive; 125 otherwise an issuer may later find out in court that despite
compliance with all of the other detailed provisions of the rule, the
exemption was not available after all.
Among the most serious deficiencies of the new rule are the provisions dealing with the nature of the offerees.1 2 6 The issuer and any
person acting on its behalf must have reasonable grounds to believe
and in fact believe prior to the offer that each offeree either "has such
knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that he is
capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment," or "is able to bear the economic risk of the investment."1 2 7 And
it must have reasonable grounds to believe and in fact believe priorto
the sale that each purchaser has the same knowledge; or, if the
purchaser can bear the risk, then he and his offeree representative
together must have the requisite knowledge.
How much "knowledge and experience" is necessary? How many
stock transactions must a lawyer have handled to possess the requisite
knowledge and experience? How wealthy does one have to be to be
able to "bear the economic risk?" Even the ability to put up $150,000
does not guarantee that one is able to "bear the economic risk of the
investment;" that wealth test 2 8 applies only to the provision for
counting the number of offerees, not to this sophistication provision. Is
the son of a living millionaire able to bear the risk? Suppose the offeree
has a large salary but also has a large family to support? Is his own
assurance that he can take the chance relevant? Does it make a
difference whether the issuer is an established company or a new
venture? The provision is patently uncertain.
Probably the most significant elements of uncertainty, which render
the entire rule inadequate in light of its avowed purpose, are the
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e) (1975); see note 45 supra.
See text accompanying notes 85-88 supra.
See, e.g., rule 147 quoted in note 89 supra.
17 C.F.R. § 230.146(d) (1975), supra note 44.
Id. § 230.146(d)(1)(i)-(ii).
Id. § 230.146(g)(2)(i)(d); see text accompanying note 73 supra.
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indefinite terms "reasonable" and "unreasonable" which appear at
least fourteen times in the new rule. One need not be familiar with the
two famous "due diligence" cases 1 29 under the 1933 Act to appreciate
the uncertainty inherent in standards such as "reasonable grounds for
belief," "reasonable investigation," and the like.
Similar problems are posed in another context by the words "material" and "misleading." The amended version of rule 146(e), which sets
forth the information that must be furnished or to which there must be
access, allows the issuer to condense the registration statement information or omit details, but only "if, under the circumstances, the
omitted information is not material or the condensation of information
does not render the statements made misleading.' 130 A new note
(reinforced by the release) places the burden of proof on the issuer to
show that the condensation of information is not misleading and that
the omitted information is not material. Even where the plaintiff
ostensibly has the burden of proving such a material omission or
misstatement the defendant may be found liable, even if the misstatement or omission was in fact innocent. Therefore, only a foolhardy
issuer's lawyer would rely on the permission to omit or condense where
his client has the burden of proof of non-materiality.
The inevitable conclusion is that the rule fails in its design "to
curtail uncertainty to the extent feasible" by "providing more objective
3
standards."' '
V.

INADEQUACY OF RULE 240

As pointed out above, rule 146 is designed for the "almost-public"
offering. 1 32 No exception is provided for the small business. Most of
these businesses will qualify for the intrastate exemption; 13 3 but the
solicitation of even one non-resident will destroy that exemption. 134 It
is anomalous that rule 147 theoretically can be used in lieu of rule 146 to
exempt from the requirements of registration an offering to millions of
people and worth millions of dollars, while an offer by a single individual
to another to "go in with him" in the formation of a business would, unless
rule 146 were complied with, subject the "offeror" to the liabilities of the
Act solely because the person he approached happened to be a non129.

Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott

v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.

1968).

130.
131.
132.

17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e)(2)(b)(A) (1975).
Rule 146 Adopting Release, supra note 7, at 2907-2.
See text accompanying notes 107-108, 122-123 supra.

133.

Since the Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(1 1), 15 U.S.C. § 7 7c(a)(1 1)(1970), and rule 147 permit

even a public offering to local residents for a local business, obviously a more limited attempt to
secure local investors would also be permitted. See notes 16 & 89 supra.
134.

17 C.F.R. § 230.147(d) (1975).
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resident of the state where the business was to be conducted. There are
too many out-of-state suburbs for such treatment to make sense. Accordingly, a close corporation exemption was an obvious necessity.
It is clear that the SEC has the power to exempt completely and
unconditionally any offering (even a public one) which does not exceed
$500,000,135 Ralston Purina notwithstanding. Recognizing the inadequacy of the basic private placement rule in the small business
area, the SEC exercised this power to promulgate rule 240,136 addressed to small businesses, including close corporations.
The requirements of rule 240 are basically simple:
(1) The total sales of securities by the issuer without registration (i.e., in reliance on the rule and otherwise) within a 12-month period
cannot exceed $100,000.
(2) There can be no more than 100 beneficial owners, as
opposed to offerees.
(3) There can be no general advertising and no commissions
paid for securing purchasers.
(4) Resales of the securities must be restricted (including
placing a legend on the certificates).
(5) A form (form 240) must be filed with the SEC Regional
Office, at least for any sales after the first $100,000.137
Special provisions designate which shareholders shall not be counted
in determining the number of beneficial owners and whose securities shall
not be counted in determining the $100,000 total. Generally these are
ameliorative. For example, a husband and wife living in the same home
138
shall be counted as only one beneficial owner.
Compared with rule 146, this "Exemption of Certain Limited Offers
and Sales by Closely-Held Issuers" is a model of clarity 139 and, although
135. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970), provides: "(b) The Commission
may from time to time by its rules and regulations, and subject to such terms and conditions as
may be prescribed therein, add any class of securities to the securities exempted as provided in this
section, if it finds that the enforcement of this subchapter with respect to such securities is not
necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount
involved or the limited character of the public offering; but no issue of securities shall be exempted
under this subsection where the aggregate amount at which such issue is offered to the public exceeds
$500,000." This statute, pursuant to which rule 240 was promulgated, is quoted in Rule 240
Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 84,946.
136. See notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
137. 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (1975).
138. Id. § 230.240(f)(I)(i).
139. Despite its clarity, rule 240 has given rise to certain intepretive questions: e.g., who is a
"full-time" employee, and who is a person "who has the same home as such beneficial owner?"
There is also the perennial "integration" problem. See,'e.g., Interpretive Response, BNA Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. No. 304, at C-2 (May 28, 1975); Interpretive Response, BNA Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. No. 308, at C-1 (June 25, 1975). Fortunately, however, the initial formation of a genuinely
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unheralded as such, it represents a much safer harbor than its rule 146
counterpart. In sharp contrast to rule 146, a small business' original
issuance of securities under rule 240 is free from the uncertainties caused
by the access, information, sophistication and wealth requirements of
rule 146. Furthermore, there are no restrictions on the number or
qualifications of the offerees, although the rule does use the vague
"reasonable grounds to believe" after "reasonable inquiry" language with
regard to the number of purchasers.140 Because of the high number of
permissible owners (100), a much less serious problem is posed than
under rule 146, however.
Fortunately, the SEC was able to provide relative certainty in rule 240
without overburdening the issuer. It is ironic, however, that smaller
issuers, whose purchasers need the most protection, are permissively
regulated by rule 240, whereas larger, more responsible issuers, whose
purchasers need less protection, are subject to the infinitely more burdensome rule 146. For example, it is anomalous that rule 240 permits almost
three times as many purchasers as rule 146. Where an offering comes
under rule 146 and all its protective provisions, such a strict limitation on
the number of purchasers is unnecessary. And where those protections
are absent in a rule 240 offering, the 100 purchaser ceiling seems overly
generous.
Ultimately, rule 240, like rule 146, seems to have been drafted with an
eye toward the almost-public offering, rather than the typical small
business offering. This is evidenced in part by the resale provisions. 141
Securities issued under rule 240 are treated as though they were issued
under rule 146, i.e., only the issuance of the securities, not the securities
themselves, is exempt, and resales are restricted.1 42 The same release
small business will ordinarily fall within the protective perimeters of the rule regardless of any
interpretive questions. Even more significantly, an attorney forming such a small business will
probably comply with the rule even though he is unaware of its existence. There may, however,
be a problem with later financing, and the rule does not avoid the problem of re-transfers,
discussed at text accompanying notes 141-156 infra.
140.

17 C.F.R. § 230.240(f) (1975). See text accompanying notes 72-76 supra for a dis-

cussion of the number of purchasers limitation of rule 146(g).
141. 17 C.F.R. § 230.240(g) (1975).
142. Rule 240 Adopting Release, supra note 15, provides:
"Rule 240(g): Limitation on Resale
"The condition relating to resale has been revised to make clear that the securities acquired
pursuant to the rule are unregistered securities and that they are deemed to have the same status
as if they were securities acquired in a transaction pursuant to Section 4(2) under the Act.
"The rule requires the issuer to exercise reasonable care to assure that purchasers are not acting
as underwriters, which reasonable care includes at least making reasonable inquiry to determine
if the purchaser is buying for himself or others, informing the purchaser of the restrictions on
resale, and legending of the certificates.
"In connection with such restrictions, the Commission is amending Rule 144 to include within
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which adopted rule 240 also amended rule 144(a)(3) to make that rule
43
applicable to resale of rule 240 securities.1
Rule 144(a)(1) defines "an 'affiliate' of an issuer [as] a person that
directly, or indirectly, through one or more intermediaries, controls, or is
controlled by, or is under common control with, such issuer." 14 4 Since
possession of a small number of shares in a typical close corporation may
result in control over the business, any shareholder is likely to be an
"affiliate" or "control" person. 145 Obviously in the smallest of close
corporations, those with a single shareholder, the sole shareholder is sure
to qualify for this unfortunate characterization, the result of which is that
the shareholder-seller is treated like an issuer 14 6 and the buyer, especially
if he divides the shares when he resells, may be treated like an underwriter. 14 7 In such a case, the seller and buyer must comply with the
quantity and information requirements of rule 144 or may risk criminal
the definition of 'restricted securities' those securities acquired from the issuer in a transaction in
reliance on Rule 240 under the Act or which were issued by an issuer in a transaction in reliance
on Rule 240 and were acquired in a transaction or chain of transactions not involving any public
offering. Thus, Rule 144 would be available for resales of securities acquired pursuant to Rule
240." (footnote omitted).
143. Rule 144(a)(3) 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3) (1975), as amended by Rule 240 Adopting Release,
supra note 15, defines "restricted securities," resales of which are controlled by the rule, as "securties
acquired directly or indirectly from the issuer thereof, or from an affiliate of such issuer, in a
transaction or chain of transactions not involving any public offering or from the issuer in a
transaction in reliance on Rule 240 under the Act or which were issued by an issuer in a transaction in
reliance on Rule 240 and were acquired in a transaction or chain of transactions not involving any
public offering."
Technically, transfers of private placement securities by ordinary shareholders should find their
exemption under section 4(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(l) (1970), which exempts
"transactions by any person other than an issuer, undervriter, or dealer." The section 4(2) exemption
for private placements technically applies only to "transactions by an issuer not involving any public
offering." Id. § 77d(2). However, since a controlling shareholder is treated as an "issuer" under
section 15, Id. § 77o, and a shareholder buying from him may become an "underwriter" by virtue of
section 2(11), Id. § 77b(11), it is probably accurate to speak of a private placement by a selling
shareholder and to apply the issuer tests. The SEC itself seems to recognize this by its reference, in
amended rule 144(aX3), to a"chain of transactions not involving any public offering ... "See I Loss.
supra note 18, at 642-43.
144. This definition is typical of those found in other SEC Rules. See, e.g., rule 251, 17
C.F.R. § 230.251 (1975).
145. "Control" is not defined in the statute. It generally has been interpreted to mean the
power to cause the corporation to file a registration statement, and its presence is a question of
fact. Obviously, ownership of a majority of the shares carries control. However, considerably
fewer shares may be sufficient, and "group control" is recognized. See generally I Loss, supra
note 18, at 557; 2 Loss 770-83. Kripke, in The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some
Realities, 45 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1151, 1163 n.65 (1970), suggests that anyone holding officer
status may be deemed to be in control. Even though it has been held that the burden of proof of
control is on the plaintiff (Ayers v. Wolfinbarger, 491 F.2d 8, 15 (5th Cir. 1974)), the existence of
such control in the average close corporation should not be difficult to establish.
146. Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970).
147. Id. § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11).
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penalties for violation of the provisions of the Act relating to issuers and
48
underwriters.

In addition, under rule 144 there is an availability of public information requirement 4 9 which will be difficult to meet, a requirement that the
shares be held for two years,' 5 0 and a quantity limit on resales (one
percent of the class of securities in any six-month period) which will make
the rule impossible for most close corporations to use. The foregoing
illustrates that rule 144 is not appropriate for closely-held businesses.
Although rule 240 makes no express reference to it, rule 237151
presumably is an available alternative to rule 144 for transfers of
securities issued under the small business exemption. While rule 237
increases the required holding period to five years, it compensates for this
by dispensing with the onerous current information requirement of rule
144.152 However, it limits the securities sold in any one year to "the lesser
of the gross proceeds from the sale of 1 percent of the securities of the
class outstanding or $50,000 in aggregate gross proceeds" 53 Furthermore, rule 237 is not available to an affiliate of the issuer, as defined in
rule 144 to include controlling shareholders. These limitations similarly
make rule 237 useless for most close corporations.
A leading commentator, Homer Kripke, characterized the originally
proposed rule 240 as "another disaster," pointing out that it would not
immunize a typical close corporation transaction such as the sale of all the
stock of an incorporated pizza parlor by its sole owner to another pizza
twirler.' 54 The rule, as adopted, is subject to the same criticism, and this
is a fatal defect. Consequently, careful close corporation practitioners
will advise their clients to use the sale of assets method of transferring a
business, despite possible tax disadvantages. 155
The average close corporation practitioner, however, will probably be
unaware of even the existence of rule 240. Yet all conditions of the rule
must be met for the exemption to be granted. Our hapless selling
shareholder will, therefore, be forced to seek refuge in either the uncertain pre-rule 146 private placement case law,' 5 6 or, as the SEC apparently wants, the inappropriate rule 144.
148.

United States v. Wolfson, 405 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 946 (1969).

149.

See note 91 supra.

150.

17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d) (1975).

151.
152.

See note 90 supra; text accompanying notes 90-92 supra.
See note 91 supra.

153.

17 C.F.R. § 230.237(b) (1975).

154.

Kripke, supra note 7, at 6, cols. 4-5.

155. See S. Hagendorf, Tax Guide for Buying and Selling A Business 26-28 (2d ed. 1971).
156. See text accompanying notes 21-40 supra.There is very little law on the relationship of
the Securities Acts to the truly small business. Ayers v. Wolfinbarger, 491 F.2d 8, 16 (5th Cir.
1974), appears to be the first case holding that the sale of stock to a promoter group qualified as
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This sale of stock can hardly be the type of transaction that the
Securities Act was designed to inhibit. Such restrictions on innocuous
transfers represent the principal drafting defect in rule 240.
However, probably the worst feature of rule 240 is the possible "spill
over." 157 For example, the clear negative implication of the rule is that all
business interests, including those participating in the initial formation of
close corporations, are subject to the Securities Act of 1933 unless
exempted by the SEC. And although the SEC expressly disclaims
exclusivity of rule 146,158 the rule's standards will undoubtedly influence
courts in judging the availability of the private placement exemption. 59
The fact that rule 146 makes no exception from its onerous requirements
for the truly close corporation may well suggest to the courts that the only
close corporation exemption is to be found in rule 240, and failure to
comply is equivalent to a violation. If this occurs, the courts can expect a
flood of rescission suits if the business goes sour. 160 This additional risk
for the small businessman still courageous enough to have hope in the
country's future is antithetical to what is needed in the present state of the
economy. Accordingly, despite what were obviously good intentions on
the SEC's part, Professor Kripke was correct in characterizing the rule as
' 161

"another disaster.

If the SEC wants to cover the field, as the proliferation of new rules
suggests, what is needed is a single unified rule 162 that brings rules 146
and 240 closer together and offers a blanket exemption (of the securities rather than merely the original issuance transaction) for small
an exempt nonpublic offering. The paucity of cases is probably explained by the previously
widespread assumption that the Securities Act had no application to dose corporations. But cf.
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.), modified, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D.

Pa. 1947), which involved a close corporation and was the first case to impose liability under rule
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the primary purpose of which was "Etlo provide for

regulation and control of [securities exchanges and of over-the-counter markets]." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78(b) (1970)). Until the SEC comes forward with an adequate small business exemption, much

more litigation in this area can be expected in this age when business is bad and, according to an
SEC Commissioner, the "consumer is king." Address by Commissioner Sommer, The Banking,
Corporation and Business Law Section, New York State Bar Association, Jan. 24, 1974, in
Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer. 171 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 30, 1974, at 1. col. I.
157. The term is borrowed from Alberg & Lybecker, supra note 7, at 653.

158. "The Commission recognizes that no one rule can adequately cover all legitimate private
offerings and sales of securities. It is to be emphasized that the Rule does not provide the
exclusive means for offering and selling securities in reliance on section 4(2)." Rule 146 Adopting
Release, supra note 7, at 2907-11.
159. See Alberg & Lybecker, supra note 7, at 642-43.
160. See, e.g., Henderson v. Hayden, Stone Inc., 461 F.2d 1069 (5th Cir. 1972).
161. Kripke, supra note 7, at 6, col. 5.

162.

There seems to be no objection to promulgation of a single rule under authority of more

than one section of the statute. See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (Jan. 11, 1972),

[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. T 78,487, promulgating rule 144.
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1 63

businesses,
or at -least an unqualified transaction exemption for all
initial and subsequent "offerings" by the original owners of a small
business. 164

VI.

How

SHOULD THE RULES BE CHANGED?

As intimated above, adoption of Federal Securities Code section
227(b) might well be the most satisfactory solution to the entire private
placement problem.' 65 In a few lines, using simple language, unclouded
by the ambiguities and uncertainties of the multitude of present SEC
rules designed to handle the matter, it deals effectively with not only
the three most common private placement situations, but also with the
troublesome problem of re-transfers.
Using the same numerical limit on purchasers (thirty-five) as rule
163. E.g., an asset limitation of $500,000 or less, perhaps based on Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 1244; or a shareholder limitation of ten based on Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1371(aXl) (the ten
shareholder limit is ongoing, i.e., the corporation can never have more than the limit, with
certain persons counted as one); or a combination asset/shareholder limitation might be used.
Thus, rule 240(f)-(g) could stand, and the issuer and its shareholders could be given a blanket
exemption for their shares, provided the other requirements continued to be met. Obviously, the
filing and re-transfer restrictions of the rule would be removed. An emphasis on the qualification of
the issuer could be accomplished, as in § 1244 of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, by a limit on tile
number of authorized shares where a corporation is involved.
164. This would be undersections 2(11), 4(1) and 4(2) ofthe Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(lI), d(l), d(2)
(1970). The New York intrastate exemption, 13 N.Y.C.R.R. § 80.9(1968), 2 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep.
35,621, at § 80.9 (1968), promulgated by the New York Attorney General to exempt offerings from
the New York Fraudulent Practices Act, N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 359-ff (McKinney Supp. 1974),
would be a better model than the Uniform Securities Act § 402(b)(9), 7 Uniform Laws Ann. 755
(1970). The New York exemption provides: "Pursuant to section 359-ff, subdivision 3, of the General
Business Law of the State of New York, small offerings to a promoter group, small offerings to a
related group, as defined in these regulations, offers and sales of any interest or participation in a
collective trust fund maintained by a bank which interest or participation is issued in connection with
a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plan which meets the requirements for qualification under
section 401 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and offerings made to fewer than 10 persons are
hereby exempted from the provisions of section 359-ffofthe General Business Law. Offerings within
the scope of this section are automatically exempted without application." 13 N.Y.C.R.R. § 80.9
(1968), 2 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 35,621, at § 80.9 (1968). The New York exemption includes tile
following definitions:
"(2) Promoter. All officers, directors, principals or controlling persons of a venture.
(3) Related group. A group where a family or long time business or personal relationship
exists between one or more of the promoters and each and every member of the group.
(5) Small offering. An offering which seeks to raise no more than $40,000, not including the
personal investment of promoters." Id. § 80.1(j), 2 CCH Blue Sky L. Rep. 35,621, at § 80,1(j)
(italics deleted). See also the definitions in rule 240(a), 17 C.F.R. § 230.240(a) (1975).
Both the amounts of money and numbers of persons involved should undoubtedly be higher,
and rule 240's term, "owners" (purchasers), is preferable to the uncertain offeree concept. See text
accompanying notes 165-178 infra for further discussion of how the rules should be changed.
165. See text accompanying notes 94-100 supra.
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146, section 227(b) adequately handles the problem of small business
formation and expressly permits typical small business transfers,
avoiding the present uncertainties of rule 240 in this regard. The thirtyfive purchaser maximum, coupled with a three year limit on fragmentation (but wisely allowing a "bulk transfer" of the original purchaser's
participation), may pose policing problems. Nevertheless, it offers a
much simpler answer to the "almost-public" offering with which rule
146 seems principally concerned.
By not imposing any number, dollar, or re-transfer limits on sales to
institutional purchasers, section 227(b) adequately covers another important private placement area. Omitted are the complex sophistication, access and information requirements of rule 146 and its correlative transfer provision, rule 144. Obviously, from the issuer's point of
view, the closer the SEC can come to adopting section 227(b) as a rule
the better.
Because section 227(b) does not impose any dollar limit on the size of
the offering, section 3(b) of the 1933 Act could not serve as a partial
umbrella for a rule adopting it. However, neither section 4(2), nor
Ralston Purina's interpretation of section 4(2), mandate any dollar
limit on the securities offered under the nonpublic offering exemption.
In fact, the Ralston Purina test which equates private placement with
lack of need for the protection of the Act can arguably be used to
validate section 227(b)'s failure to limit the number of initial institutional inxkestors and re-transfers by them to other such investors.
It is not completely clear whether the SEC has the power under the
Act to entirely overrule the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
language of section 4(2). Some sections of the 1933 Act expressly
empower the Commission to interpret or alter their terms, but section
4 does not contain such an express authorization. Section 19(a) of the
Act, under which the Commission purported to act in adopting rule
146, also does not expressly authorize Commission interpretation or
amendment. 166 The Ralston Purina case itself gives some, but not
166. Section 19(a) provides: "The Commission shall have authority from time to time to
make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this subchapter, including rules and regulations governing registration statements
and prospectuses for various classes of securities and issuers, and defining accounting, technical,
and trade terms used in this subchapter. Among other things, the Commission shall have
authority, for the purposes of this subchapter, to prescribe the form or forms in which required
information shall be set forth . . . ." However, it concludes: "No provision of this subchapter
imposing any liability shall apply to any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity with any
rule or regulation of the Commission, notwithstanding that such rule or regulation may, after
such act or omission, be amended or rescinded or be determined by judicial or other authority to
be invalid for any reason." 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1970).
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unequivocal, support to the Commission's power to vary the tests of
67
that decision. 1
But even if the Ralston Purina tests cannot be overruled, they are
susceptible of more than one interpretation.' 68 There is nothing to
prevent a narrow interpretation, which certainly need not include the
lower court embellishments. Any apprehension about tampering, at
least with these lower court decisions, should be allayed by the
concluding language of section 19(a) which protects persons relying on
1 69
SEC rules prior to their judicial invalidation.
Even if it were legally possible to dispense completely with the
Ralston Purina safeguards, from the point of view of investor protection it might be undesirable to do so, at least in the case of the
almost-public offering to non-institutional investors. On the other
hand, Ralston Purina should be given a sensible interpretation which
70
places primacy on its "need for the protections of the Act" test.'
The only valid concern of a private placement rule is the protection
of actual purchasers (or transferees from them), rather than offerees
who are not harmed if they do not purchase. Thus, although the mode
of offering should be controlled (e.g., by a prohibition on general
advertising), the portions of rule 146 which attempt to protect offerees
rather than actual purchasers should be deleted as in Code section
227(b) and rule 240.
Rule 146 and the judicial decisions it largely codifies are anomalous
in affording greater protection to purchasers than they would get from
registration itself. A sensible reading of Ralston Purina would be to
require in the alternative either sophistication, or access to or furnishing of registration-type information. A rule which insures that a
purchaser gets the same information he would get on registration
should be sufficient to meet the sophistication ("ability to fend-forhimself") test.
The present rule's alternative access requirement for reporting com167.

The Supreme Court stated: "The Commission would have us go one step further and

hold that 'an offering to a substantial number of the public' is not exempt under § 4(1) [now
§4(2)]. We are advised that 'whatever the special circumstances, the Commission has consistently
interpreted the exemption as being inapplicable when a large number of offerees is involved.' But
the statute would seem to apply to a 'public offering' whether to few or many. It may well be that
offerings to a substantial number of persons would rarely be exempt. Indeed nothing prevents the

commission, in enforcing the statute, from using some kind of numerical test in deciding when to
investigate particular exemption claims. But there is no warrant for superimposing a quantity
limit on private offerings as a matter of statutory interpretation." SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (footnote omitted).
168. See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
169. See note 166 supra.
170. See text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra.
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panies 17 1 is unobjectionable. It is not burdensome on such issuers and
gives even greater protection to the purchasers than ordinary registration, since even in a registered offering the purchaser does not always
receive a final prospectus (i.e., the principal information which registration offers) until after he has bought the security, and as a memorial
to his folly. 17 2 The rule could continue to provide the purchaser of a
non-reporting company's private placement with greater protection
than registration would afford, and yet not overburden the issuer, by
requiring the issuer to secure from the purchaser an acknowledgment 173 that he had timely received sufficient information, or by
giving the purchaser a right of rescission for a certain period after
availability of the information. Again, of course, exact requirements
should be spelled out rather than relying on vague terms such as a
"reasonable time."
The present rule concedes in its "access" provision that there can be
a substitute for actual information. It also intimates that insiders,
family members, and the wealthy are not in as great a need of
protection as the average investor. An exception to the actual furnishing of information based on such criteria seems amply justified by the
Ralston Purina case; however the rule fails to provide one. An
amendment to the rule is needed to give these factors, specifically
defined, full recognition as alternatives to a duty to prepare the
informal registration statement.
Thus, paragraph (d) of the present rule, with its ambiguous sophistication test, should be repealed, since sophistication is not a required
complement to information. 74 It should be replaced with a disjunctive
to actual information, enumerating the persons who presumptively
have access to such information. The definition of these persons should
171.

17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e)(i)(a)(1)-(2) (1975).

172. Realizing this, the SEC has made extensive efforts to assure availability of at least the
preliminary prospectus to potential purchasers. See, e.g., Securities Act Rule 460, Id. § 230.460; Exchange Act Rule 15c2-8, Id. § 240.15c2-8, adopted in SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 5101 (Nov. 19, 1970), [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 5 77,929; SEC
Securities Act ReleaseNo. 4968(Apr. 24, 1969), [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
77,685; cf. Securities Act Rule 256, 17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (1975), concerning reg. A. offering

circulars.
173.

Vhile on a "hot issue," a purchaser might be pressured into signing, there probably is no

more danger to the investor than under a registered offering where the purchaser may commit
himself without actually reading the prospectus. Furthermore, this would still offer the investor

more protection than he would get under rule 240 under which he is not entitled to any
information.
174. See, e.g., the interpretation given to Ralston Purina by the district court opinion in
United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 247 F. Supp. 481, 489 (D. Md. 1965), aft'd, 376
F.2d 675 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967), which combined sophistication and access

by stating the test to be whether the offeree is able to discover the information for himself.
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be precise. Rule 147 with its purely mechanical tests could be used as a
model. 175 "Insiders" (perhaps as defined in section 16 of the 1934 Act
and the implementing SEC rules), relatives, trusts, estates and corporations related to the issuer or insiders (perhaps as defined in the
number of purchasers provisions of the present form of rule 146 or in
the aggregation provisions of rule 144), "promoters" (perhaps as
defined in rule 240), and persons who agree to take significant dollar
amounts of the securities offered (perhaps as defined in the number of
purchasers provisions of the present form of rule 146), together with
persons who represent that their net worth is high enough that they
can bear the risk of the investment, should all be exempt from the
information-furnishing requirement. And, of course, institutional investors, the concern of proposed ALI Federal Securities Code section
227(b), 176 should be exempt from the information-furnishing requirement under the foregoing proposal for revision of rule 146.
Since the "offeree representative" is necessary only to meet the
sophistication test of paragraph (d), the provisions dealing with him
can be dropped if the proposed changes in the rule are adopted. This
will result in an additional simplification. Obviously, the "wealthy
widow" can and should secure professional assistance if she is unable
to evaluate for herself the merits and risks of the investment, but the
issuer should not be required to make sure that she does so in a private
placement, any more than it would in a registered offering.
The offering should be treated as though it were a registered one:
the purchaser should have, or be entitled to get, only the information
which registration would disclose. As a practical matter, the issuer
may have to supply more information in order to make the sale, but
this should be left to the purchaser's relative bargaining power. It
should not be a condition for the availability of the exemption.
Rule 240 could be substantially retained for the small business.
However, with today's inflation, the maximum dollar limit ($100,000)
is rather low. On the other hand, the maximum number of owners
(100) is probably unnecessarily high. It would make more sense to
reverse the rule 146 and rule 240 purchaser limits. The higher limit
175. The only serious deficiency of rule 147 is its incorporation of the same vague integration
of offerings criteria which rule 146 also adopts. See Kant, SEC Rule 147-A Further Narrowing
of the Intrastate Offering Exemption, 30 Bus. Law. 73 (1974), for a further criticism of the rule.
176. It must be conceded, however, that adoption of Code § 227(b) as the new private
placement rule might pose certain dangers to institutional investors, in view of its blanket
exemption of them. Although significant institutional and other sizeable investors have enough
clout to compel the issuer to make full disclosure to them, a blanket exemption for all institutional
investors might enable an issuer in a "hot issue" to coerce such investors, especially the smaller
ones, into foregoing the information needed to make a wise investment decision, by threatening to
exclude them from participation if they refuse to make an immediate "blind" commitment.
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should be available at least for certain specified rule 146 issues and
purchasers (e.g., debt securities of reporting companies sold to institutional ("corporate") investors), even if such purchasers are unwilling to
take a $150,000 participation.
Clear and unencumbering resale provisions are essential. Rules 144
and 237 should continue to be generally available. However, there
should also be a provision for "bulk sales" (re-transfers without fractionalization). As a compromise, the liberal proposed Code section
227(b)(B), which limits retransfers by setting a maximum number of
owners during a three year period, would be acceptable. Transferees
should not be required, even for a limited time, to meet the sophistication, access, or information received requirements of original purchasers, for this might inhibit unnecessarily
certain innocuous transfers
177
(e.g., Kripke's pizza parlor).
From the above it is clear that many of the provisions of the present
rules can still be used. Equally obvious is the need to delete all of the
ambiguous language from the provisions which remain. Terms such as
"reasonable belief," "reasonable inquiry," and the like should be
blue-pencilled. Even if the requirements for the exemption are not
relaxed, the issuer should still be told exactly what it must do to
comply. Undesirable as such a law might be, a statute making littering
a felony (providing "littering" were clearly defined) would still be
preferable to one making any "unreasonable conduct" a misdemeanor.
It may also be helpful for the SEC to promulgate a form of
investment agreement (formerly "investment letter") and acknowledgment of receipt of information for
the issuer's files as acceptable
178
proof of compliance with the rules.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In recent years, the SEC has proven that it can draft clear mechanical tests to replace the vague guidelines and folklore which have
plagued the securities laws for so long. Rules 146 and 240 fail to live
up to the expectations engendered by these earlier, successful efforts.
Not only are the requirements for the private placement and small
business exemptions overly burdensome, but, at least in the case of
177. See text accompanying note 154 supra.
178. The "Subscription Agreement and Investment Letter" utilized unsuccessfully by the
offerors in the Continental Tobacco case could serve as a model. See SEC v. Continental Tobacco
Co., 463 F.2d 137, 146 n.1 (5th Cir. 1972).
Under the present rule the issuer should, of course, obtain from each offeree and each

purchaser a separate written acknowledgment of receipt of the necessary information, including
all additional information desired. See note 104 supra. A statement by each offeree that he meets
the sophistication or wealth requirements of the rule is also desirable, although such self-serving
declarations probably will be given little weight.
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rule 146, they even fail to achieve the SEC's goal of clarity.
Businessmen deserve an easily accessible safe harbor. At least they
should be given a clear chart of the shoals and reefs on the approach.
Rules 146 and 240 should be changed before they result in the
litigation their present form is bound to provoke. Hopefully they will
be re-amended to accommodate more successfully the legitimate needs
of issuers by giving them a single, certain, integrated guide, based on
practical considerations, and covering both initial and subsequent sales
of their securities.

